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As a part of planning an air mission, the trajectory of an air-to-ground (A/G) weapon must be
determined. In this thesis, the novel trajectory evaluation framework with which the best trajectory
can be identiﬁed from a set of possible trajectories under uncertainty regarding the locations of
surface-to-air (S/A) threats is presented. The best trajectory is the trajectory which has the
highest survivability, i.e., the probability for the A/G weapon to traverse the trajectory without
being intercepted.
The trajectory evaluation framework relies on two new models introduced in this thesis which
together provide the survivability of a given trajectory. The spatial prediction model is used to build
a probability map for the location of an S/A threat based on Bayesian reasoning with geographical
data and knowledge about common tactical principles utilised in forming an air defence. The
Markov survivability model describes the process of intercepting an A/G weapon with the air
defence consisting of radar sensors and S/A weapons with an inhomogeneous continuous-time
Markov chain. Using the probability maps produced by the spatial prediction model, the Markov
survivability model produces the survivability of the trajectory, such that uncertainties regarding
the locations of the S/A threats are taken into account.
The Markov survivability model presented in this thesis is compared with existing reference sur-
vivability models through numerical experiments by replacing it in the framework with each of
the reference models. In the experiments, the survivabilities of diﬀerent trajectories obtained with
each model are evaluated and compared. The sensitivity of the models to uncertainty regarding
the locations of S/A threats is studied by varying sizes of areas in which it is believed that the
threats are located. The experiments imply that the novel framework gives intuitive results. In
addition, the Markov survivability model is less aﬀected by imprecise information regarding the
locations of the S/A threats than the reference models.
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Ilmaoperaation suunnitteluun sisältyy operaatiossa käytettävien ilmasta-maahan -aseiden reit-
tien valinta siten, että aseisiin kohdistuu ilmatorjunnasta mahdollisimman vähän uhkaa. Tässä
työssä esitellään uusi menetelmä, jolla arvioidaan ilmatorjunnan aiheuttamaa uhkaa annetulla
lentoradalla lentävään ilmasta-maahan -aseeseen, kun ilmatorjunnan tarkkaa ryhmitystä ei tiedetä.
Menetelmässä käytetään kahta tässä työssä kehitettyä mallia: ryhmityksen sijaintijakauman tuot-
tavaa mallia ja ilmasta-maahan -aseeseen annetulla lentoradalla kohdistuvan uhkan kertymistä
kuvaavaa mallia.
Ilmatorjunnan ryhmityksen sijaintijakauma määritetään Bayesiläisen päättelyn avulla käyttämällä
maantieteellisiä tietolähteitä ja tiedustelutietoa todennäköisistä ryhmitysalueista. Ilmasta-maahan
-aseeseen annetulla lentoradalla kohdistuva uhka arvioidaan jatkuva-aikaiseen Markov-ketjuun pe-
rustuvalla mallilla, joka kuvaa ilmatorjuntayksikön kykyä havaita ase, seurata asetta ja vaikut-
taa aseeseen. Sijaintijakaumaa hyödyntämällä Markov-malli tuottaa todennäköisyyden sille, että
yksi tai useampi ilmatorjunta-ase onnistuneesti torjuu ilmasta-maahan -aseen. Markov-mallin ja
samalla koko menetelmän tuottama lopputulos huomioi ilmatorjunnan ryhmitykseen liittyvän epä-
varmuuden.
Tässä työssä esiteltyä Markov-mallia verrataan numeerisin kokein kahteen ilmatorjuntaa kuvaavaan
referenssimalliin. Kokeissa verrataan kunkin mallin tuottamia ilmasta-maahan -aseeseen kohdistu-
via uhkia eri lentoradoilla kahdessa skenaariossa. Mallien alttiutta epätarkkuuksille sijaintitiedossa
tutkitaan varioimalla ilmatorjunnan ryhmitysalueen suuruutta ja tarkastelemalla, kuinka hyvin
mallit säilyttävät lentoratojen keskinäisen uhkajärjestyksen. Kokeiden tuloksena voidaan todeta,
että uuden menetelmän hyödyntämä Markov-malli yhtäältä tuottaa realistisia uhka-arvioita ja
toisaalta se on vähemmän altis epätarkkuuksille ilmatorjunnan ryhmityksen sijaintitiedossa verrat-
tuna referenssimalleihin.
Avainsanat: Ilmaoperaation suunnittelu, jatkuva-aikaiset Markov-ketjut, geoinformatiikka,
sijaintijakauma, tutka
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The identiﬁcation of the best possible trajectory for an air-to-ground (A/G) weapon
is an integral part of air mission planning (see, e.g., [6, 17]). The best trajectory is
such that the probability for the A/G weapon to traverse the entire length of the
trajectory without being intercepted by any surface-to-air (S/A) threats is greater
than with any other plausible trajectories. The locations of the S/A threats play
a central role in their capabilities to intercept the A/G weapon. Thus, knowledge
regarding the locations of the possible S/A threats is of utmost importance when de-
termining the best trajectory for the A/G weapon [6]. However, precise information
regarding these locations is seldom available. Therefore, such location uncertainty
should be treated when evaluating the alternative trajectories of the A/G weapon.
In this thesis, the novel trajectory evaluation framework for evaluating the trajec-
tories of A/G weapons under uncertainty regarding the locations of the S/A threats
is presented. The framework illustrated in Figure 1.1 consists of the spatial predic-
tion model and the Markov survivability model which are developed in this thesis
and used to produce a survivability measure for a given trajectory. The survivability
measure is the probability for the A/G weapon to traverse the trajectory without
being intercepted by S/A threats. Within the trajectory evaluation framework, the
spatial prediction model produces a probability map for each S/A threat. These
probability maps are then used by the Markov survivability model to provide the
survivabilities of feasible trajectories. Thus, using the framework, the best trajec-
tory is determined from the given set of the trajectories. The framework is used
in the planning of air missions when a choice between the multiple A/G weapon
trajectories is made to ensure the successful outcome of the air mission.
Threat inducing systems which are of interest when evaluating trajectories of
A/G weapons include S/A missiles and anti-aircraft cannons as well as aircraft
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Figure 1.1: The trajectory evaluation framework presented in this thesis.
tracking radars which are used in accordance with guided S/A missiles. With a
slight abuse of terminology, the term S/A threat system or simply S/A threat is
used throughout this thesis to refer to all of these diﬀerent types of threat causing
systems. These S/A threats are assumed to consist of a radar sensor which is used
as a part of the air defence and can be accompanied with an S/A weapon which
is used together with the radar sensor to intercept the A/G weapon. That is, an
aircraft tracking radar can exist by itself but an S/A weapon is always accompanied
by the radar sensor.
In this thesis, the S/A defence is assumed to consist of independent S/A threat
groups. An S/A threat group in turn comprises target acquisition radars, ﬁre control
radars, and S/A weapons. For the S/A threat group to successfully intercept an
A/G weapon, the A/G weapon must ﬁrst be detected and tracked by the S/A
threat group's target acquisition radars. These send their detection information to
a joint radar tracker which attempts to form a track of the A/G weapon based on
all of the detections achieved by the target acquisition radars. Once the tracker has
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formed the track of the A/G weapon, it is passed over to the ﬁre control radars.
Each ﬁre control radar is linked to a single S/A weapon. In order to use the S/A
weapon to intercept the A/G weapon, the associated ﬁre control radar must have
acquired the track of the A/G weapon. It is assumed that the ﬁre control radar and
the S/A weapon are always co-located, and they are jointly referred to as an S/A
threat unit. Each ﬁre control radar independently attempts to form the track of
the A/G weapon. These radars do not share detection information with each other.
Thus, each ﬁre control radar must be able to detect and track the A/G weapon
independently in order for the associated S/A weapon to be used. When the ﬁre
control radar successfully forms the track, the associated S/A weapon thereafter
attempts to intercept the A/G weapon, if the A/G weapon is in the range of the
S/A weapon.
The spatial prediction model developed in this thesis combines geographical and
intelligence information, and through Bayesian reasoning [32] it produces a proba-
bility map for an S/A threat, i.e., the probability for the S/A threat to be situated
at any given location. The probability map gives a distinct probability for the event
that the S/A threat system is located at any given location. In order to estimate
the locations of the S/A threat systems, methods for analysing the passability of the
terrain and the quality of alternative locations for S/A defence in terms of visibility
are developed. Intelligence information and knowledge about strategic principles
commonly used in planning air defence with diﬀerent types of S/A threat systems
are also taken into account. The intelligence information used by the spatial predic-
tion model concerns the capabilities of the S/A threats and areas in which the S/A
threats are believed to be located. Additionally, a novel method for reducing the
probability map to a discrete number of possible locations is presented. The prob-
ability map reduction method is applied to reduce the computational requirements
of the trajectory evaluation framework.
The Markov survivability model presented in this thesis is used to provide the
probability that an A/G weapon is tracked and intercepted. The A/G weapon is be-
ing tracked if the air defence has suﬃcient information regarding the A/G weapon's
movements for the use of the S/A weapons. The A/G weapon is intercepted if the
S/A weapon has been successfully utilised and the A/G weapon has been destroyed.
The Markov survivability model is based on a four state inhomogeneous continuous-
time Markov chain [9] (see also Appendix B). Each Markov chain which is used
while evaluating the survivability of a given trajectory describes a single S/A threat
unit's capability to intercept the A/G weapon. The ﬁrst state of the Markov chain
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is means the target acquisition radars of the S/A threat unit's threat group have
not yet been able to form the track of the A/G weapon. The target acquisition
radars might have detected the A/G weapon but not with suﬃcient regularity to
form the track. Once the S/A threat group's target acquisition radars successfully
form the track of the A/G weapon, the Markov chain advances to the second state
and the ﬁre control radars commence trying to acquire a track. The third state of
the Markov chain is reached when the ﬁre control radar associated with the S/A
threat unit which the Markov chain is describing successfully forms the track of the
A/G weapon. Finally, the fourth state is reached when the threat unit's weapon
intercepts the A/G weapon.
When evaluating a trajectory, all of the Markov chains of which each describes a
single S/A threat's capabilities to intercept the A/G weapon are solved as described
in Appendix B. The survivability of the trajectory is obtained by calculating the
probability that none of the Markov chains corresponding with the S/A threat units
are in the fourth state at the end of the trajectory. The transition rates between
the states of the Markov chain depend on parameters which are determined through
the expected time needed for a transition under optimal conditions. The optimal
conditions are the best possible detection capability for transitions corresponding
to the forming of a track and interception of the A/G weapon, and zero detection
capability for transitions corresponding to the loss of the track. The transition rates
also depend on the probability of detection by radar sensors.
If exact locations of S/A threats are known, the Markov survivability model
provides the survivabilities of alternative trajectories traversed by the A/G weapon.
Since the exact locations of the S/A threats are rarely known, the spatial prediction
model is used to estimate probability maps for the S/A threats. By using these
probability maps, the Markov survivability model generates the survivabilities of
the trajectories by taking into account uncertainties regarding the locations of the
S/A threats. These survivabilities are used to rank the trajectories into a priority
order and identify the best trajectory.
The Markov survivability model is compared with two reference survivability
models  the Erlandsson model [11] and the technical survivability model [34] 
through numerical experiments conducted in this thesis. The comparison is carried
out by evaluating trajectories with the trajectory evaluation framework and by re-
placing the Markov survivability model in the framework in turn with each of the
reference models. Similar to the Markov survivability model, the Erlandsson model
also relies on continuous-time Markov chains to estimate the survivability of an
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A/G weapon traversing its trajectory. In the Erlandsson model, each Markov chain
portrays a single S/A threat group's capability to intercept the A/G weapon. The
Erlandsson model was originally developed to calculate the survivability of trajec-
tories for aircraft and not A/G weapons as is the case with the Markov survivability
model. The Erlandsson model diﬀers from the Markov survivability model also in
the manner in which state transition rates are deﬁned. While the state transition
rates in the Markov survivability model are directly aﬀected by the probability of
detection by radar sensors, the transition rates in the Erlandsson model are explic-
itly dependent on the location of the A/G weapon. The area around S/A threats is
classiﬁed into sensor and weapon areas. Each target acquisition radar is assigned a
sensor area in which the radar is able to detect and track the A/G weapon. Each
S/A threat unit is associated with a weapon area in which the threat unit's ﬁre
control radar is able to detect and track the A/G weapon and the S/A threat unit's
weapon is capable of intercepting the A/G weapon. The state transition rates are
varied depending on the areas in which the A/G weapon is located at a given time.
The survivability of a given trajectory is obtained by calculating the probability that
none of the Markov chains corresponding with the S/A threat groups are in the ﬁnal
state representing the event that the A/G has been intercepted by the S/A threat
units at the end of the trajectory. Similar to the Markov survivability model, the
Erlandsson survivability model also uses the probability maps produced with the
spatial prediction model to take into account uncertainty regarding the locations of
the S/A threats.
The technical survivability model recognises that target acquisition radars oper-
ate in search mode and thus scan the surrounding airspace in an organised manner.
It follows that a target acquisition radar is directed in a given direction only at given
intervals. On the other hand, it is assumed that in order for a track to be formed,
the target acquisition radar must achieve a given number of successful detections
of an A/G weapon on consequent scans. Taking these two notions into account,
the technical survivability model provides the probability of successfully forming
the track of the A/G weapon by the target acquisition radar. After this, the model
calculates the probability whereby the ﬁre control radar is able to obtain the track
of the A/G weapon and maintain this track for the duration required to aim, launch,
and guide the S/A weapon in order to intercept the A/G weapon. Combining these
probabilities, the technical survivability model gives the probability whereby an S/A
threat unit is capable of intercepting the A/G weapon at a given time. The surviv-
ability of a given trajectory is determined by calculating the probability that none of
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the S/A threat units are able to destroy the A/G weapon along the trajectory. The
probability maps produced by the spatial prediction model are used by the technical
survivability model to take into account uncertainty regarding the locations of the
S/A threats.
The novel trajectory evaluation framework presented in this thesis takes into
account geographical data and uncertainties regarding the locations of S/A threats
in more depth than any previously constructed models. The developed spatial pre-
diction model produces a probability map for the location of an S/A threat system
and takes into consideration requirements for its surrounding terrain set by charac-
teristics and principles governing the use of the S/A threat system. Existing spatial
models [17] describing possible locations of S/A threat systems have not taken into
account similar aspects and have been based on measurements from radar sensing
sensors on board an aircraft. With the probability map reduction method intro-
duced in this thesis, the processing of probability maps is performed signiﬁcantly
more eﬃciently than would otherwise be possible.
Unlike previous introduced survivability models based on Markov chains [11, 12],
the Markov survivability model also takes into account the need to track an A/G
weapon with radar sensors before it can be intercepted and the theoretical capa-
bilities of the radars to detect the A/G weapon. These capabilities include the
directionality of the radar cross section of the A/G weapon which describes the
characteristics of the weapon in regard to the radar sensor's capability to detect it.
The trajectory evaluation framework also treats the uncertainty of S/A threat sys-
tems' locations which is described by probability maps constructed with the spatial
prediction model.
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Previous research related to
spatial analysis and S/A survivability modelling is discussed in Chapter 2. The
description of the problem of determining the best trajectory for an A/G weapon
which is solved by the framework presented in this thesis is given in Chapter 3.
The spatial prediction model and the Markov survivability model are introduced in
Chapter 4 and are followed by the presentation of reference survivability models in
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides the results of numerical experiments as well as the
comparison of the Markov survivability and the reference models. Finally, the thesis
is summarised and future research is discussed in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Related research
Research into the evaluation of trajectories traversed by aerial devices has yielded
numerous diﬀerent approaches to the modelling of the survivability of a trajectory for
an aerial device and to the optimisation of the trajectory of the device to maximise its
survivability. The survivability of the trajectory for the aerial device is represented
with the probability that the device is able to traverse the trajectory unharmed. A
proposed straightforward approach is to deﬁne high risk areas into which the device
must not navigate [31]. These no-ﬂy zones represent areas in which it is likely for
the aerial device to be harmed, and it is assumed that outside these areas the device
can navigate with relatively high survivability. Another approach to evaluate the
threat caused to aerial devices is to deﬁne a cost function for the route of the device
that is inversely proportional to the fourth power of the distance between the aerial
device and the S/A threat system [2, 27]. The relation of the cost function to the
fourth power of the distance is motivated by the relationship between the signal-to-
noise ratio achieved by radar sensors and the range of the target which the radar
is attempting to detect. A similar cost function has been proposed by Pachter and
Hebert [26]. They optimise routes for the aerial device with respect to the integral
of the cost function over the course of the trajectory and give an analytic solution
through the calculus of variations [22].
Radar detection is a stochastic process [25] and thus it is natural to address radar
tracking and ultimately the possible interception of the aerial device as stochastic
processes. A possible approach to modelling the stochasticity of radar detection and
aerial device survivability is to use Markov chains as the basis for the models [10].
Erlandsson [11] proposed a Markov chain model where the transition rates depend on
whether the aerial device is within a threshold distance from the S/A threat system
and takes into account the need for the threat system to detect and track the aerial
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device before it can be engaged. Another approach proposed by Erlandsson [12] is
the use of a simpliﬁed two-state Markov chain where the rates of transition decrease
either linearly or quadratically with the distance from the S/A threat system. The
new Markov survivability model used in the trajectory evaluation framework intro-
duced in this thesis builds on the models described here. However, in addition to
recognising the distinct stages of radar detection, the Markov survivability model
also strives to take into account the technical capabilities of the S/A threats.
A radar sensor's capability to detect and track an aerial device depends also
on the terrain and the orientation of the aerial device. The topography plays a
role since if the aerial device is shadowed by the terrain, the S/A threat system
cannot detect or track the device. For example, Zheng et al. [35] have shown how an
evolutionary algorithm can be used to plan a route that maximises the use of terrain
masking while simultaneously minimising the length of the route and maximising
the distance from known S/A threat system sites. The directionality of the radar's
capability to detect and track an aerial device, i.e., the radar cross section of the
device plays a key role and has been taken into account for example by Kabamba
et al. [21]. They recognised that the radar cross section of an aerial device is often
irregular, but for modelling purposes they used an ellipsoidal model for the radar
cross section. The radar cross sections used in the trajectory evaluation framework
are the actual measured radar cross sections of the A/G weapons being considered.
Thus, the route evaluations given by the framework are more accurate than those
calculated using ellipsoidal radar cross sections.
Models studying the threat inﬂicted on aerial devices traversing trajectories in
the vicinity of S/A threat systems often assume that the locations of the threat
systems are known. However, this is usually not the case and there is almost al-
ways at least some uncertainty in the location of the S/A threat systems. Jun and
D'Andrea [20] discuss how the path of an unmanned aerial vehicle can be optimised
based on a probability map generated from radar sensing sensor readings and a
Bayesian survivability model. The uncertainty involving the locations of the S/A
threat systems has also been studied by Erlandsson [11] by assuming a two dimen-
sional Gaussian probability density function for the threat systems' locations and
by utilising Monte Carlo simulation methods [23]. A diﬀerent perspective to the
modelling of uncertainty regarding the positions of S/A threat systems is to cate-
gorise each location in the area into a discrete number of classes, each representing
a diﬀerent degree of threat [4]. The probability of being intercepted in any given
location depends on the degree of threat assigned to the location in question.
8
Hespanha et. al [17] demonstrate how a probability map of S/A threat systems'
locations can be built with noisy radar sensing sensors. They use Bayesian reasoning
to build the probability map for the radars. The spatial prediction model developed
in this thesis is similar to Hespanha et. al's model in many ways. Both models strive
to estimate the locations of S/A threat systems and both models apply Bayesian
reasoning. However, the data utilised is diﬀerent. Hespanha et. al use noisy data
from radar sensing sensors while the spatial prediction model uses geographical
and intelligence information to form the probability map. The probability map
generated with the spatial prediction model could be used as the a priori probability
distribution in methods such as Hespanha et. al's.
The spatial prediction model presented in this thesis can be described as spatial
analysis. Spatial analysis, see e.g., [24], is the analysis and extraction of knowledge
from spatial data. Spatial data is information where geographic location and time
play a vital role. Spatial data links descriptive properties, attributes, or events to a
geographical location or point in time [14]. In the spatial prediction model presented
in this thesis, spatial data such as elevation, tree height and land cover data is used
to calculate a probability map for the location of S/A threat systems.
Similar spatial analysis has been applied in many diﬀerent ﬁelds of research, e.g.,
to predict the locations of future events or estimate characteristics of certain geo-
graphical areas by using geographical data. For instance, landslide hazard prediction
by geographic analysis methods has been studied [7]. Spatial analysis has also been
applied to predict the locations of archeological sites [13] and species distribution [1].
However, in all of these applications there is prior data available and as such they
all apply inductive reasoning such as regression analysis to obtain results.
Turning to the analysis of S/A threat systems siting, studies concerning how
one should place air defence missile batteries exist [3, 16]. The problem of ﬁnding
the best possible location for an air defence missile battery, taking into account the
terrain, visibility, and other tactical properties that aﬀect the eﬃciency of the defence
battery, is referred to as the missile siting problem. Even though the perspective into
the problem is opposite between the missile siting problem and the task of estimating
the locations of enemy S/A threat systems, these two problems are essentially quite
similar. In both problems, it is necessary to obtain knowledge about whether it
is possible for an S/A threat system to operate at a location and whether there is
suﬃcient visibility from the location in question.
In addition to addressing the missile siting problem, Franklin et al. [16] take
an extensive look at line of sight algorithms and their performance. In particular,
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Franklin et al. study viewshed and visibility index algorithms. Viewshed is the
surface area, which is visible from any certain vantage point and the visibility index
is a value that can be calculated for any point on a surface, and tells how good the
visibility is from that location [16]. In addition to exact algorithms, Franklin et al.
also present many interesting approximative algorithms that can be used to speed
up calculations. Methods inspired by the work of Franklin et. al. are used in the
spatial prediction model to determine the visibility from a given location.
To summarise, the trajectory evaluation framework presented in this thesis builds
on previous Markov chain models and takes into account the technical capabilities
of S/A threats with more precision than earlier models. Unlike previous survivabil-
ity models based on Markov chains, the new Markov survivability model presented
in this thesis takes into account the directional radar cross-section and topological
restrictions in the operation of S/A threats. Furthermore, the trajectory evaluation
framework utilises methods from the realm of spatial analysis to estimate the un-
known locations of the S/A threats. Earlier published models which strive to build
a probability map for the S/A threats utilise data from radar detector sensors, while
the new spatial prediction model introduced in this thesis uses geographical data to
enhance existing intelligence information regarding the locations of the S/A threats.
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Chapter 3
Trajectory planning problem
The trajectory planning problem discussed in this thesis is the problem faced in A/G
air mission planning, when one must decide on a single trajectory out of many pos-
sible alternatives, to be used by an A/G weapon during the mission. The outcome
which the spatial prediction model and the Markov survivability model together
attempt to achieve is the successful identiﬁcation of the best possible trajectories of
A/G weapons with respect to the risk of being intercepted by an S/A threat. The
best trajectory is the trajectory with the highest survivability, i.e., the highest prob-
ability for the A/G weapon to successfully traverse the entire trajectory unharmed.
The survivability of the trajectory is dependent on the whereabouts of S/A threat
systems and on the S/A threat systems' technical capabilities to detect and inter-
cept the A/G weapon. The real world problem setting including the aforementioned
dependencies and associated uncertainties, as well as the principles utilised in the
spatial prediction and Markov survivability models to take into account these un-
certainties, are discussed in this chapter.
3.1 Real world problem setting
In the trajectory planning problem, the ultimate objective is to deliver an A/G
weapon through enemy defences to a given target location. A variety of diﬀerent
trajectories are given as alternatives and the task is to choose the trajectory along
which the A/G weapon has the highest probability of reaching the target unharmed.
The target is protected by a defence which consists of threat systems. Sometimes
the exact locations of threat systems are known, but in many cases this is not the
case. In such instances, all available intelligence information regarding the threat
systems and the terrain should be taken into account to estimate the threat systems'
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locations. Threat systems can be characterised as sensors and weapons [28]. Slightly
simplifying, the role of the sensors is to instruct and aim the weapon so that the
weapon can successfully intercept the A/G weapon.
Sensors are used in diﬀerent roles as either target acquisition sensors or ﬁre
control sensors [34]. In some instances, a single sensor can have several of the
mentioned roles simultaneously. The target acquisition sensors are sensors that
search the surrounding airspace for targets. Once a target acquisition has detected
a possible target it attempts to form a track, i.e., gather information regarding
the location, velocity, and heading of the target. The track formed by the target
acquisition sensor is not accurate enough to be used directly with an S/A weapon
to intercept the weapon and a ﬁre control sensor is used to form a more accurate
track. The ﬁre control sensor is a sensor which is dedicated to forming an accurate
track of the target, which can be used by the S/A weapon to intercept the target.
The process during which threat is induced onto the A/G weapon can be de-
scribed with a chain of events that begins from the ﬁrst detection of the A/G weapon
by the early warning sensors and terminates once an S/A threat unit has successfully
intercepted the A/G weapon. The chain of events can be portrayed with six discrete
phases [34]. In the ﬁrst phase, the early warning sensors detect the A/G weapon
and alert the S/A defence to intercept it. In the second phase, the target acquisition
sensors acquire a track for the A/G weapon. After this in the third phase, the target
acquisition sensors pass the track of the A/G weapon over to the ﬁre control sensor.
The fourth phase consists of the ﬁre control sensor acquiring a track of the A/G
weapon, and in the ﬁfth phase the actual S/A weapon is ﬁred. Finally, in phase six,
the A/G weapon is intercepted by the S/A weapon.
Sensors might be able to communicate detection information to one another, and
thus a track can be formed based on detections made by several diﬀerent sensors.
With such a sensor network, a track can be formed even though no single sensor is
constantly capable of detecting the target. Such sensor networks are often used in
air surveillance systems [34].
Sensors can be characterised based on the technique used to detect targets into
optical, infrared, and radar sensors [28]. Optical sensors use visible light to detect
and locate targets. Optical sensors include electro-optical sensors which utilise the
visible spectrum of electromagnetic radiation and the human eye. Optical sensors are
intuitive in a sense that the capability to detect a target by such a sensor is similar
to a person's capability of seeing the target. As such, optical sensors' shortcomings
include deteriorating capabilities when faced with limited visibility which can be
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due to smoke, fog, or clouds, and limited detection capability in the lack of light,
e.g., during the night. Infrared sensors are electro-optic sensors which rely on the
infrared spectrum of electromagnetic radiation. Infrared sensors share some of the
shortcomings of optical sensors but since an infrared sensor detects heat from the
source, the infrared sensor might be able to spot a target more easily and does not
depend on lighting conditions. Radar sensors depend on electromagnetic radiation
with longer wavelengths to detect targets. The capabilities of radar sensors to detect
targets are not as much aﬀected by visibility limitations as optical and infrared
sensors. However, radar senors must be accompanied with an artiﬁcial radiation
source, i.e., a transmitter.
Sensors and weapons can either be stationary or set on a mobile platform [28].
Mobile platforms are either wheel-, track-, or foot-based. Depending on the propul-
sion system of a platform, i.e., wheels, tracks, or foot, the platform can have diﬀer-
ent passability in diﬀerent terrains. A platform on wheels, for instance, can travel
quickly on roads but poorly in forests, whereas tracked vehicles cannot travel as fast
on roads but can travel in a wider range of terrain including forests.
When considering the problem of evaluating A/G trajectories in a real world
setting, there are numerous uncertainties which are diﬃcult, and in some cases
impossible to eliminate. These include uncertainties regarding the positioning of the
S/A threats, the technical capabilities of the S/A threats, and weather conditions
which can aﬀect the S/A threats' abilities to detect and intercept the A/G weapon.
In addition to these uncertainties, there are human aspects which can have an eﬀect
on an S/A threat's capability to operate eﬃciently as many S/A threat systems rely
on a human operator.
3.2 Modelling assumptions and simpliﬁcations
In this thesis, the task of evaluating trajectories of an A/G weapon when faced
with uncertainties mentioned above is tackled by combining two separate models.
The spatial prediction model addresses the uncertainties regarding the positioning
of S/A threats by forming a probability map for the threats, and the Markov sur-
vivability model with the help of the probability map determines the probability for
an A/G weapon to successfully traverse a trajectory without being harmed by any
S/A threats. The survivability model strives to take into account the uncertainties
concerning the technical capabilities of the S/A threats by treating track formation
and interception as Poisson processes, see e.g., [32]. The intensity parameters of the
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Poisson process depend on technical parameters of the S/A threat, characteristics of
the A/G weapon and the geometry between the S/A threat and the A/G weapon.
Only radar sensors are considered.
In the spatial prediction model, it is argued that the location of an S/A threat
system can be estimated based on three distinct observations. The ﬁrst observation
is based on the fact that diﬀerent types of threat systems are regularly operated and
situated with diﬀerent principles [3]. Some systems might be used for close range
air defence, while others might be situated further away from the actual target
which they are defending. This and all available intelligence information is taken
into account in the grouping index (GI). The grouping index describes how well a
certain location is situated regarding the target which the air defence is protecting.
The assumed threat bearing and the common tactical principles for how the speciﬁc
threat system is used are also taken into account. This grouping index is used as
the a priori distribution for the location of an S/A threat system.
Second, it is unlikely for a threat system to be located in an area from which it
is impossible for it to operate. For example, wetlands are areas in which it may be
impossible for a threat system to operate. Such impossible areas may account for a
great portion of the entire area under observation. Further, if it is assumed that the
adversary has a ﬁnite amount of time to form their air defence, and thus it might
be impossible for the threat systems to reach certain locations. These observations
are described with the passability index (PI). The passability index is used as the
likelihood that a threat system is capable of navigating to and operating from a
given location.
The third observation regards the visibility from possible threat systems' loca-
tions. For an S/A threat system to operate properly, it must have suﬃcient visibility
to detect and engage the target. The visibility from each location is described with
the visibility index (V I). It is argued that it is more likely for an air defence system
to be located at a location with good visibility than at a location with bad visibility.
The visibility index is used as the likelihood that there is suﬃcient visibility from
a given location for an S/A threat system to operate eﬃciently. Combining these
observations the spatial prediction model gives a probability map for an S/A threat
from which the probability whereby the S/A threat is located a given location is
read.
The spatial prediction model uses geographical data from three diﬀerent sources:
a digital elevation model provided by the National Land Survey of Finland, the
CORINE Land Cover 2006 material generated by the Finnish Environment Institute,
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and a dataset consisting of the height of the forest cover. All of the data is in raster
form. This means that the datasets have been discretised into pixels and each pixel
is given a certain value. The pixel size for all of the datasets is 25 metres.
The CORINE Land Cover 2006 (CLC2006) is a dataset that consists of infor-
mation concerning the nature and usage of land areas. In the CLC2006, each pixel
is categorised into one of the 44 diﬀerent land cover categories supported by the
CLC2006. The digital elevation model and the forest cover height data sets are
simply rasters that contain one integer for each pixel indicating the average height
above sea level or forest cover height, depending on the data set in question.
In the Markov survivability model, the basic unit in an air defence system is an
S/A threat group. The S/A threat group consists of one or more target acquisition
radars and S/A threat units. The target acquisition radars and the S/A threat
units can be situated at any distance from each other or at the same location on
the same platform. The S/A threat unit consists of an S/A weapon itself and a
ﬁre control sensor. The target acquisition radars are capable of acquiring a track
that can be passed on to the threat unit, but the S/A threat unit cannot intercept
the A/G weapon solely based on the track formed by the target acquisition radar,
and it must track the target with its own ﬁre control radar as well. The target
acquisition radars in the S/A threat group share information about detections with
each other. Thus, the track which is passed on to the S/A threat units can be
acquired through information gathered from all the target acquisition radars within
the group. However, the ﬁre control radars do not share detection information and
each ﬁre control radar must track the target independently for the associated S/A
threat to be able to intercept the A/G weapon. In reality, an air defence system
would also include one or more early warning sensors, which are the ﬁrst to detect
an incoming threat and alert the rest of the air defence system to act on the threat.
In the Markov survivability model discussed in this thesis, it is assumed that the
early warning sensors have already detected the A/G weapon and the S/A threat
groups are aware of the incoming A/G weapon.
The Markov survivability model uses the probability of detection as a measure of
S/A threats' capability to detect the A/G weapon. Due to interference by stochastic
noise, radar detection is a stochastic process and the probability that an S/A threat
is able to detect an A/G weapon in a given location and orientation is calculated as
shown in Appendix A.
The Markov survivability model strives to determine the survivability of an A/G
weapon ﬂying a given trajectory in an area inﬂuenced by short- and medium-range
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S/A threats. The survivability of the A/G weapon on the given trajectory is deﬁned
to be the probability whereby the weapon is able to traverse the trajectory and reach
its target unharmed. The model determines the kill-probability whereby the A/G
weapon will not be able to traverse the trajectory and reach its target unharmed,
and the survivability of the weapon is then calculated as the complement of the
kill-probability.
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Chapter 4
Trajectory evaluation framework
The trajectory evaluation framework proposed in this thesis is used to solve the
trajectory planning problem. The trajectory evaluation framework takes as inputs
intelligence information regarding the threat systems in the area, information about
the terrain, characteristics of the A/G weapon and a set of trajectories which are to
be evaluated. The framework then determines the survivability of each trajectory.
The survivabilities of the trajectories can then be used to determine the trajectory
with which the A/G weapon would have the highest probability of reaching its
target. The framework can be separated into two distinct phases, each of which
are completed by separate models. First, a probability map of each S/A threat is
formed with the spatial prediction model. These probability maps are then used
by the Markov survivability model to determine the survivability of each trajectory.
In this chapter, the details of both the spatial prediction model and the Markov
survivability model are discussed.
In the forthcoming text, the separate threat groups are referred to with super-
script k = 1...N , where N is the total amount of threat groups. The individual
target acquisition radars are referred to with subscript i = 1...nk, where nk is the
amount of target acquisition radars in threat group k. Similarly, the threat units in
a threat group are referred to using subscript j = 1...mk, where mk is the amount
of threat units in threat group k. In Chapter 4.1, the spatial prediction model is
discussed by only referring to S/A threat systems with subscripts i, i.e., target ac-
quisition radars. Exacly the same logic applies to S/A threat units which would be
referred to with subscripts j. The term S/A threat system is a generic term and it
is used to refer to both target acquisition radars and S/A threat units.
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4.1 Spatial prediction model
In order to form the probability map of an S/A threat system, the Bayes' rule is
used:
P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
, (4.1)
where A and B are events, P (A) is the a priori probability, P (B|A) is the likelihood
function and P (A|B) is the a posteriori probability.
In the spatial prediction model, the a priori distribution for the location of the
S/A threat system i of threat group k is represented by the grouping index, i.e.,
P (Xki = x, Y
k
i = y) = GI
k
i (x, y). The grouping index gives the a priori probability
that the threat system is situated at a location with coordinates (x, y). Here Xki = x
and Y ki = y depict the events that the longitude and latitude coordinates of the S/A
threat system i of threat group k are x and y.
The S/A threat system is not situated at a location from which it does not have
suﬃcient visibility to operate eﬃciently or a location to which it is impossible for
it to navigate in a given time frame. The likelihood that a given location can be
reached by the threat system in a given time is described with the passability index
denoted by PIki (x, y). The likelihood that there is suﬃcient visibility for the threat
system to operate at a given location is described with the visibility index denoted
by V Iki (x, y). This is written as
P (Passki |Xki = x, Y ki = y) = PIki (x, y),
P (V isibki |Xki = x, Y ki = y) = V Iki (x, y),
for the S/A threat system i of threat group k, where Pass represents the event
that the threat system is situated at a location to which it is possible for the threat
system to navigate in the given time frame. In turn, V isib depicts the event that
the threat system is situated at a location from which there is suﬃcient visibility
for the threat system to operate eﬃciently.
Based on Bayes' rule (4.1), the posterior distribution for the location of the S/A
threat system i of threat group k is
P (Xki = x, Y
k
i = y|Passki , V isibki ) ∝ P (Passki , V isibki |Xki = x, Y ki = y)P (Xki = x, Y ki = y),
(4.2)
where P (Xki = x, Y
k
i = y) is the a priori probability map of the S/A threat, i.e.,
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the grouping index GIki (x, y). Equation (4.2) gives the probability for the threat
system i to be located at coordinates (x, y), given that it is possible for the threat
system to navigate to the location and there is suﬃcient visibility from the location
for a threat system to operate eﬃciently.
By making the assumption that the events Passki and V isib
k
i are conditionally
independent when conditioned with the location of the threat system, the expression
for the posterior distribution is simpliﬁed. Since the two events are conditionally
independent, their joint conditional probability is calculated as the product of the
two individual conditional probabilities. By substituting the individual conditional
probabilities with the respective indices, the posterior distribution (4.2) is
P (Xki = x, Y
k
i = y|Passki , V isibki )
∝ P (Passki |Xki = x, Y ki = y)P (V isibki |Xki = x, Y ki = y)P (Xki = x, Y ki = y)
= PIki (x, y)V I
k
i (x, y)GI
k
i (x, y).
This posterior distribution is the probability map for a single threat system,
which is produced by the spatial prediction model. In short, the probability map
for threat system i of threat group k is denoted with
P kL,i(x, y) = PI
k
i (x, y)V I
k
i (x, y)GI
k
i (x, y). (4.3)
The probability map P kL,i(x, y) gives the probability for the threat system i of threat
group k to be located at any given location (x, y).
4.1.1 Indices
Passability index (PI)
In the spatial prediction model, terrain passability plays an important role in esti-
mating the location of a threat system. If it is not possible for the threat system
to operate at a certain location or it is impossible for a threat system to navigate
to a location, there is zero probability for the threat system to be there. Also, if it
is impossible for a threat system to travel to a certain location within a given time
frame, the threat system will have zero probability of being located at the given site.
Thus, the passability index is set to be one if the time needed to travel to the site
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is less than or equal to the time constraint and zero otherwise, i.e.,
PIki (x, y) =
{
1 if tkmin,i(x, y) ≤ tmax
0 otherwise
, (4.4)
where tmax is the time constraint set for forming the air defence and tkmin,i(x, y) is
the traversal time to location (x, y) for threat system i of threat group k.
In order to calculate the time needed to navigate from a known depot, i.e.,
the starting place from which S/A threat systems move to their positions, to any
given location, a grid graph G(V,E) that consists of vertices V and edges E is
built. Vertices V correspond to each possible location (x, y) and edges E resemble
a transition from a certain location to another adjacent location ((x1, y1), (x2, y2)).
Each vertex is connected to all of its eight neighbors with an edge. By default, the
graph coincides with the rasterisation of the digital elevation model and CLC2006
dataset. It is assumed that each vertex is located at the center of each pixel. The
cost of each edge corresponds to the time consumed in the transition. Thus, the
cost c of traversing the edge between the two vertices is calculated as follows:
c =
δ/2
v
+
δ/2
v′
=
δ(v + v′)
2vv′
, (4.5)
where δ refers to distance between the two neighbouring vertices (x1, y1) and (x2, y2).
The variables v and v′ are the velocities at which a threat system is capable of
navigating at locations (x1, y1) and (x2, y2).
It is assumed that the threat systems spread out from a given number n > 0 of
depots for which the locations are known. The minimal time tmin(x, y) needed for the
traversal from the depot(s) to each location in the area is calculated with Dijkstra's
algorithm [8] using the grid graph G(V,E) where the edge costs are determined with
Equation (4.5).
One way of estimating the velocities v, by which the diﬀerent systems can nav-
igate in diﬀerent terrains, is based on the use of the coeﬃcients of deceleration as
proposed by Hofmann et al. [18]. The coeﬃcients of deceleration used in the model
are coeﬃcients corresponding to the slope and the nature of the terrain. These are
referred to as the slope and terrain coeﬃcients.
The slope coeﬃcient is calculated by using the digital elevation model and the
terrain coeﬃcients are determined by using the CLC2006 data. The velocity v(x, y)
at which a threat system is able to navigate is calculated as the product of the
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maximum velocity of an S/A threat system and the two deceleration coeﬃcients,
v(x, y) = vmax × Cslope(x, y)× Cterrain(x, y), (4.6)
where vmax is the maximum velocity at which a threat system can navigate in any
terrain, Cslope is the slope coeﬃcient, and Cterrain is the terrain coeﬃcient. Both
the slope coeﬃcient and the terrain coeﬃcient have values in the range C ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, the velocity v(x, y) calculated for a threat system at each location (x, y)
ultimately evaluates to the range [0, vmax]. If either coeﬃcient is valued at C = 0, it
is impossible for a threat system to function or navigate at that location. Velocities
determined with Equation (4.6) are substituted in Equation (4.5) to determine the
edge costs when building the grid graph whereby the minimal traversal times are to
be calculated.
The logical premises for the slope coeﬃcient are quite obvious  if the terrain
has a suﬃciently large gradient, it is hard or impossible for any threat system to
operate or navigate there. The greater the gradient, the smaller the slope coeﬃcient
becomes, symbolising the terrain becoming harder and harder to traverse. Details
regarding the calculation of the slope coeﬃcient are given in Appendix C.
The evaluation of the terrain coeﬃcient is simply a question of determining a
single coeﬃcient of deceleration for each of the diﬀerent land cover categories in the
CLC2006 dataset. This should be done separately for each diﬀerent threat system
type.
Visibility index (V I)
One of the main factors in the terrain that aﬀects an S/A threat systems' operating
capabilities at any location is the visibility. An S/A threat system requires good
visibility to operate. In order to engage targets, a threat system must have a direct
line of sight to them. In the calculation of the line of sight, the curvature of the
Earth, as well as the terrain and the tree height are taken into account. It is also
assumed that light travels in a straight line.
In the spatial prediction model, it is assumed that S/A threat systems have a
higher probability of being situated at locations from which they have good visibility
than in locations with poor visibility. As a measure of visibility, the model uses the
mean maximum distance from which an object moving at a given altitude can be
sighted. The model is given the principal threat bearing and the width of the
observation sector. This sector is then divided into a given amount of sub-sectors,
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and the maximum distance to which there is visibility at a given height is calculated
in each sub-sector. Finally, when this maximum distance has been calculated for
each sub-sector, the arithmetic mean is calculated over all of these. This mean is
ﬁnally used as the measure of visibility.
The mean of the maximum distances µmax(x, y) to which there is visibility for a
given altitude htrgt in the S subsectors is computed as
µmax(x, y) =
∑
θ∈Θ
(maxl∈{R|hmin((x,y),θ,l)≤htrgt} l)
S
, (4.7)
where Θ is the set of directions corresponding to all S subsectors for which the
maximum distance with visibility is computed, and hmin((x, y), θ, l) is the minimum
altitude to which there is visibility from coordinates (x, y) in direction θ and distance
l. Finally, the mean maximum distances are normalised to the range [0, 1], which
provides the visibility index for threat system i of threat group k
V Iki (x, y) =
µkmax,i(x, y)
max
(x′,y′)
µkmax,i(x
′, y′)
. (4.8)
The minimum altitude hmin((x, y), θ, l) to which there is visibility from a given
location (x, y), direction θ and distance l needs to be determined. The minimum
altitude to which there is visibility depends on the elevation proﬁle of the terrain
in the direction θ with distances less than or equal to l. Speciﬁcally, the minimum
altitude to which there is visibility depends on the maximum value of the tangent
of the angle between the horizontal axis and a straight line to the surface of the
elevation proﬁle with distances less than or equal to l, i.e.,
hmin((x, y), θ, l) = lτmax((x, y), θ, l), (4.9)
where l is the distance under observation, θ the direction in which the observer is
observing, (x, y) the coordinates of the observer, and τmax is the maximum value of
the tangent τ with all distances between 0 and l. Therefore,
τmax((x, y), θ, l) = max
r∈(0,l]
(
h((x, y), θ, r)
r
), (4.10)
where h((x, y), θ, r) is the height of the elevation proﬁle at distance r and direction
θ from the observer situated at location (x, y).
In the terrain elevation proﬁle, the horizontal axis is by default set to be the
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sea level and thus due to the Earth's curvature the horizontal axis is curved instead
of straight. Because of this, the terrain elevation proﬁle cannot directly be used
together with Equation (4.9) to determine the minimum altitude to which there
is visibility, but the elevation proﬁle ﬁrst must be transformed to counteract the
Earth's curvature. The line of sight from the observer to the horizon, which is a
straight line, is chosen to be the horizontal axis. The height diﬀerence between the
line of sight to the horizon and the terrain must be determined. To determine this,
the distance of the horizon is ﬁrst calculated. The geometric setup is portrayed in
Figure 4.1. As seen in Figure 4.1, the line of sight from the observer to the horizon
l
R
∆h
Figure 4.1: Geometry of calculating the distance of the horizon.
is actually a tangent of the Earth. Thus, there is a straight angle between the radius
(R) and the line of sight to the horizon (lhor) and Pythagoras' theorem is used to
calculate the distance to the horizon, i.e.,
R2 + l2hor = (∆h+R)
2 = ∆h2 + 2∆hR +R2,
l2hor = ∆h
2 + 2∆hR,
lhor =
√
∆h2 + 2∆hR. (4.11)
On the other hand, the ∆h in Figure 4.1 can also be interpreted as the change of
elevation caused by the curvature of Earth. Solving ∆h from Equation (4.11):
∆h(l∗) =
√
R2 + l∗2 −R, (4.12)
where l∗ is the distance from the horizon and R is the radius of the Earth. Equa-
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Figure 4.2: Elevation proﬁle, h refers to elevation from sea level l refers to the
distance from the observer.
tion (4.12) is written as the function of the distance from the observer as
∆h(l) =
√
R2 + (l − lhor)2 −R, (4.13)
where lhor is the distance of the horizon from the observer assuming no obstructions
and is calculated with Equation (4.11). By subtracting the height diﬀerence ∆h
given by Equation (4.13) from the original elevation proﬁle the elevation proﬁle is
transformed to take into account the Earth's curvature. Together with this trans-
formed elevation proﬁle Equation (4.9) is used to determine the minimum altitude
to which there is visibility from any given location, direction and distance. This
result is then used to calculate the visibility index with Equations (4.7) and (4.8).
The process of transforming the elevation proﬁle and determining the minimum
altitude to which there is visibility is demonstrated through a short example. Fig-
ure 4.2 illustrates a possible elevation proﬁle. In Figure 4.2, the horizontal axis is
set to equal the sea level. Due to the curvature of the Earth, this axis is actually
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curved. To counteract this, the horizontal axis is chosen to be the observer's line of
sight to the horizon, which is a straight line. To do this, the distance to the horizon
is ﬁrst calculated. In the example, it is presumed that the observer is observing
from a height of hobv = 3 m and that the Earth's radius is R = 6371 km. With
Equation (4.11), the distance to the horizon is calculated to be lhor = 6183 m. With
Equation (4.13), all of the elevations in Figure 4.2 are transformed to be relative
to the observer's line of sight to the horizon, instead of the sea level. The result is
shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Elevation proﬁle relative to the observer's line of sight to the horizon, h
refers to elevation from to the observer's line of sight to the horizon and l refers to
the distance from the observer.
The elevation proﬁle relative to the observer's line of sight to the horizon (blue)
and the minimum altitude (hmin) required for the line of sight from the observer
(red) are shown in Figure 4.4. From this ﬁgure, one can evaluate whether an object
is visible to the observer  if the object is above the minimum altitude (red line), the
object is visible. The black solid line in Figure 4.4 is a line marking the altitude of
80 metres above sea level. From the ﬁgure, one can read the maximum distance to
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which the observer can see objects travelling at 80 metres above sea level by ﬁnding
the intersection of the minimum altitude line and the 80 metres above sea level line.
The observer can see objects travelling at an altitude of 80 metres from a distance
of 6700 metres.
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Figure 4.4: Minimum visible height from point l = 0, h = 0, where h refers to
elevation from to the observer's line of sight to the horizon and l refers to the
distance from the observer. The blue line corresponds to the elevation proﬁle, the
red line is the minimum altitude to which the observer has visibility and the black
line represents the altitude of 80 metres above sea level.
Grouping index (GI)
In the spatial prediction model, the grouping index is by default deﬁned to be a two
dimensional multivariate normal distribution in the polar coordinate system with
the target which the air defence is protecting in the origin. One of the dimensions for
the multivariate normal distribution is the distance r from the target and the other
dimension is the bearing ω from the target. The mean and variance of the distance
from the target are deﬁned by the common tactical principles used when forming an
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air defence with the type of threat system in question. The mean of the bearing is
deﬁned by the direction from which an attack is being anticipated. The variance of
the bearing corresponds with the width of the sector for which the defence is being
formed. The polar coordinate multivariate normal distribution is then transformed
to the Cartesian coordinate system, which gives the grouping index
GIki (x, y) =
1
2piσrσω
exp
(
−1
2
[
(
√
(x− x0)2 + (y − y0)2 − µr)2
σ2r
+
(arctan(x−x0
y−y0 )− µω)2
σ2ω
])
,
(4.14)
where µr and σr are the mean and standard deviation of the distance from the target,
µω and σω are the mean and standard deviation of the bearing from the target, and
(x0, y0) are the coordinates of the target.
Figure 4.5 shows the multivariate normal distribution in the polar coordinate
system (Fig. 4.5a) and the corresponding augmented multivariate normal distribu-
tion in Cartesian coordinates (Fig. 4.5b). In Figure 4.5, the mean of the distance
from the target which is being defended is 1500 metres and the distance's standard
deviation is 500 metres. The direction from which the attack is anticipated from
is 45 degrees while the width of the sector for which the defence is formed is 120
degrees. The location of the target which is being protected is marked with a red
cross in Figure 4.5b.
4.1.2 Probability map reduction
The probability map P kL,i(x, y) calculated with Equation (4.3) gives the probability
for an S/A threat system to be located at coordinates (x, y). Since the possible
coordinates of the threat system are discretised, the probability map is in essence a
two dimensional discrete probability distribution. In many applications, it may be
necessary to study each possible location separately and perform diﬀerent operations
for each possible coordinate. Such operations and examinations can be done with
reasonable computational resources for small probability maps, but as the number of
possible locations grows this becomes increasingly diﬃcult and costly. To overcome
this, a method for choosing a reasonable amount of discrete locations and assigning
probabilities for them in a manner that preserves with suﬃcient accuracy the char-
acteristics of the original probability map is presented. The characteristic that is the
most important to preserve with respect to survivability models described in this
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Figure 4.5: Multivariate normal distributions from which the grouping index is
formed. The target which is being protected is marked with a red cross in Fig-
ure 4.5b.
thesis is the expected probability of detection of an A/G weapon in the airspace near
the area described by the probability map. The probability map reduction method
presented here is based on a clustering algorithm called k-means clustering [33].
The probability map reduction method should organise all possible locations
into a chosen amount κ of diﬀerent sets S = {S1, S2, S3, ..., Sκ} so that the reduced
probability map includes a discrete location from each of these sets and preserves
the expected probability of detection by the S/A threat system whose whereabouts
the probability map describes. Without probability map reduction, each area would
be given an equal amount of attention resourcewise although it would be smarter
to spend more time studying areas in where it is more likely for the S/A threat
system to be located and less time studying expanses where it is less likely for
the S/A threat system to be located. The k-means clustering algorithm tends to
produce equisized clusters, and thus the clusters and reduced locations will be more
densely distributed in areas with highly probable locations for S/A threat systems
and sparsely in areas which are unlikely to host an S/A threat system. Since each
reduced location is given equal attention in regard to computational resources, the
goal of allocating more resources to areas with a higher probability of having S/A
threat systems present is achieved. On the other hand, the less likely areas are not
completely forgotten but are merely taken into account more crudely.
At the beginning of the k-means probability map reduction method, the κ single
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most probable locations {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xκ, yκ)} are chosen as the initial κ
means and are referred to as the corresponding sets' prototypes. After this, the
k-means probability map reduction method proceeds by repeating the following two
steps until it converges on a collection of sets S = {S1, S2, ..., Sκ}.
Assignment step
Each possible location (x, y) is assigned to such a set Sι that the euclidian
distance between the location and the set's prototype is minimised, i.e.,
Sι = {(x, y) : (x− xι)2 + (y − yι)2 ≤ (x− x)2 + (y − y)2 ∀, 1 ≤  ≤ κ}.
Update step
The prototype of each set Sι is updated to be situated at the expected location
(xι, yι) of an S/A threat system in the set, given that the threat system is in
the set Sι, i.e.,
xι =
 ∑
(x,y)∈Sι
P kL,i(x, y)
−1 ∑
(x,y)∈Sι
xP kL,i(x, y)
yι =
 ∑
(x,y)∈Sι
P kL,i(x, y)
−1 ∑
(x,y)∈Sι
yP kL,i(x, y),
where P kL,i(x, y) is the probability map which is being reduced.
Once the collection of sets S has converged and the sets do not change between
iterations, the repetition of the steps is ceased, and the sets Sι are set as the ﬁnal
clusters. The most probable location is chosen from each set to be the reduced
location corresponding to that set. The event that a certain location in a set is
chosen as the reduced location, i.e., it is the most probable location in the set, implies
that the location in question is the best case location regarding the capabilities of
an S/A threat system located there. This is because for a location to be given a
high probability by the spatial prediction model, the location must be reachable in
terms of the terrain, there must be good visibility from the location, and the location
must be in unison with common tactical principles linked with the threat system in
question.
Each reduced location is given a probability which is equal to the probability for
the S/A threat system being located in any of the associated set's locations. This
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is calculated as
P kL,reduced,i(xι, yι) =
∑
(x,y)∈Sι
P kL,i(x, y). (4.15)
To summarise, before the probability map reduction the probability map P kL,i
of threat system i in threat group k was two dimensional discrete probability dis-
tribution and thus any numerical computations would have been laboursome. By
reducing the probability map to κ distinct possible locations, any computations have
been eased signiﬁcantly while preserving the characteristics of the probability map.
4.2 Markov survivability model
The survivability model presented in this thesis is called the Markov survivability
model, which is based on an inhomogenous continuous-time Markov chain that has
four possible states. Markov chains are described in more detail in Appendix B. The
Markov chain used in the model is portrayed in Figure 4.6. The model strives to
determine the probability by which each threat unit j is capable of intercepting the
A/G weapon before it reaches its target. In the Markov survivability model, each
Markov chain represents the capability of a single threat unit j to detect, track and
engage the A/G weapon. The transition rates of a single Markov chain depend on
the particular S/A threat group's k target acquisition radars' i = 1...nk capability
to detect and track the A/G weapon, the capability to detect and track the A/G
weapon by the ﬁre control radar of the speciﬁc threat unit j, and the kinematic
capabilities of the S/A threat unit's j weapon. The model takes into account the
directional radar cross section of the A/G weapon and any possible shadows cast by
the terrain.
The Markov chain upon which the Markov survivability model is based has
four states: Undetected, Tracked, Locked, and Hit. The state probabilities,
i.e., the probabilities with which the Markov chain is in each state at time t are
depicted with P kundetect,j(t), P
k
track,j(t), P
k
lock,j(t) and P
k
hit,j(t), respectively. When the
threat unit j is in the Undetected state, the target acquisition radars i = 1...nk
in the threat unit's S/A threat group k have not detected the A/G weapon with
suﬃcient accuracy to form a track. The target acquisition radars i = 1...nk might
have achieved isolated detections of the A/G weapon but not enough to infer any
valuable knowledge about the A/G weapon. Once the state transitions to Tracked,
the group's target acquisition radars have obtained enough detections of the A/G
weapon to form a track. In the Markov survivability model, the track is passed over
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Figure 4.6: The continuous-time Markov chain used in the Markov survivability
model where P kD,TAR depicts the probability that one or numerous target acquisition
radars i = 1...nk in threat group k are capable of detecting the A/G weapon at
time t and P kD,j is the probability that threat unit j of threat group k is capable of
detecting the A/G weapon at time t.
to the threat units instantaneously once it has been formed. Once the Locked
state has been reached, the ﬁre control radar of the threat unit has achieved a track
on the A/G weapon. Only this track obtained by the ﬁre control radar can be used
to guide the S/A threat's weapon, and thus it is a requirement for the interception
of the A/G weapon. Once the ﬁre control track has been acquired, the weapon of
the S/A threat unit in question instantaneously begins attempting to intercept the
A/G weapon. The ﬁnal state Hit is such that once it has been reached the S/A
threat unit has successfully intercepted the A/G weapon. This state is an absorbing
state and thus once it is reached, the system will never leave the state. Note, that
each Markov chain describes a single S/A threat unit j and thus mk separate chains
are used to describe each S/A threat group k.
As can be seen in Figure 4.6, in addition to the constant state transition rate
parameters λU,T , λT,U , λT,L, λL,T , the transition rates also depend on the range
dependent transition rate parameter λL,H(r) and time dependent variables. Thus,
the Markov chains are inhomogeneous continuous-time Markov chains. The time
dependent variables which the Markov chain depends upon are the combined ex-
pected probability of detection of the kth S/A threat group's target acquisition
radars i = 1...nk P kD,TAR(t), and the probability of detection of the jth threat unit's
ﬁre control radar P kD,j(t). The constant state transition parameters λU,T and λT,L
can be interpreted as the reciprocals of the average time needed by a target acqui-
sition radar i and S/A threat unit j to form a track for the A/G weapon assuming
each are capable of detecting the A/G weapon with probability PD = 1. Similarly,
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the constant parameters λT,U and λL,T can be interpreted as the reciprocals of the
average time it takes for a track to be lost by a target acquisition radar i and S/A
threat unit j assuming they cannot detect the A/G weapon, i.e., PD = 0. With the
range dependent transition rate parameter λL,H(r), the model strives to take into
account the range and kinematic capabilities of the weapon of the S/A threat unit
j. The range dependent parameter is deﬁned
λL,H(r) =
{
λconstL,H if r ≤ Rmax
0 otherwise
, (4.16)
where λconstL,H is the average time needed for the S/A threat unit j to intercept the
A/G weapon while it is in the eﬀective slant range of the threat unit's weapon, and
Rmax is the maximum range at which the threat unit's weapon can engage targets.
The target acquisition radars' i = 1...nk combined expected probability of detection
P kD,TAR(t) and the S/A threat unit's j probability of detection P
k
D,j(t) are determined
based on probabilities calculated as described in Appendix A.
The combined expected probability of detection of the S/A threat group's k
target acquisition radars P kD,TAR(t) gives the probability that one or more of the
S/A threat group's target acquisition radars i = 1...nk are able to detect the A/G
weapon at a given time t. The probability that a single S/A threat system at a
given location (x′, y′) can detect an A/G weapon located at coordinates (x, y, z)
and with heading φ, pitch angle θ, and roll angle ψ is P (x
′,y′)
D (x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ) and is
calculated with Equation (A.18). The probability of detection is dependent also on
the orientation of the A/G weapon as the radar cross section changes depending on
which part of the A/G weapon is facing the radar. Given a known probability map
P kL,i(x
′, y′) determined with Equation (4.3) for the ith target acquisition radar in
S/A threat group k, the expected probability of detection for the ith radar is
E
[
P kD,i(x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ)
]
=
∑
(x′,y′)
P kL,i(x
′, y′)P (x
′,y′)
D (x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ). (4.17)
Further, the combined expected probability of detection for the S/A threat group's
k target acquisition radars i = 1...nk is calculated as
P kD,TAR(t) = P
k
D,TAR(x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ) = 1−
nk∏
i=1
(
1− E [P kD,i(x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ)]) , (4.18)
where subscript i refers to the target acquisition radars in S/A threat group k, and
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(x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ) are the A/G weapon's coordinates and orientation at time t.
In order to take into account the uncertainty regarding the location of the S/A
threat unit j, the probability of successful interception of the A/G weapon by the
S/A threat unit j, i.e., P khit,j, must be determined from every possible threat unit's
location (x′, y′). When evaluating the probability of interception from a certain
location (x′, y′), the jth S/A threat unit's probability of detection P kD,j(t) is simply
the probability that the S/A threat unit j is capable of detecting the A/G weapon
which is at coordinates (x, y, z) with orientation (φ, θ, ψ) at time t, i.e.,
P kD,j(t) = P
k
D,j(x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ) = P
(x′,y′)
D (x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ), (4.19)
in which (x′, y′) are the coordinates of the S/A threat unit under inspection. This
is calculated with Equation (A.18).
The probability of S/A threat unit j located at a certain location (x, y) success-
fully intercepting the A/G weapon at some point during the trajectory )P khit,j(x, y)
is determined by solving the diﬀerential equation given by Equation (B.3). The
diﬀerential equation is numerically solved by using MATLAB's ode45 solver. The
probability of successful interception is the probability that the Markov chain is
in state Hit" at the end of the trajectory. Note, that the probability of being
in state Hit" or any other state at a given time t can also be determined from
Equation (B.3). The probabilities of successful interception by S/A threat unit j in
alternative locations are combined to form an expected probability of interception
for the threat unit j as
E
[
P khit,j
]
=
∑
(x,y)
P kL,j(x, y)P
k
hit,j(x, y), (4.20)
where P kL,j(x, y) is determined with Equation (4.3) and gives the probability for the
jth threat unit in the S/A threat group k to be located at location (x, y). The ﬁnal
probability whereby the A/G weapon is intercepted by any S/A threat unit j in any
threat group k is determined by calculating the probability that one or more threat
units are capable of intercepting the A/G weapon, i.e.,
Pkill = 1−
N∏
k=1
mk∏
j=1
(
1− E [P khit,j]) . (4.21)
Recall that N is the amount of S/A threat groups the air defence consists of and mk
is the number of S/A threat units in threat group k. Furthermore, the survivability
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of the trajectory is determined with
Psurv = 1− Pkill, (4.22)
where Pkill is calculated with Equation (4.21).
As noted earlier, the probabilities of being in any state of a single Markov chain
at time t is determined in an identical manner. The expected probability of being
in the given state is calculated by modifying Equation (4.20) appropriately by ex-
changing the probabilities P khit,j with P
k
undetect,j or P
k
track,j etc. These expected state
probabilities can for instance be used to determine the probabilities that no S/A
threat unit has been able to intercept the A/G weapon but one or more threat units
have been able to track the A/G with their independent radars.
In the situation in which the exact positions of the S/A threat systems are known
the trajectory evaluation framework is used in the same manner as presented above.
Then the probability maps of the S/A threat systems are reduced to maps that have
value 1 in the location at which the S/A threat system is located and 0 elsewhere.
The Markov survivability model takes into account the topographical features
of the surrounding terrain as well as the height of possible tree cover. These are
taken into consideration during the evaluation of the probabilities of detection PD
used in Equations 4.17 and 4.19. If there is a visual obstruction between the S/A
threat system and the A/G weapon, the S/A threat system cannot detect the A/G
weapon and the probability of detection is zero.
To summarise, the ﬁrst step in the trajectory evaluation is to determine a proba-
bility map for each S/A threat system, see Equation (4.3). Next, the expected prob-
abilities of detection by target acquisition radars i = 1...nk are determined at every
point of the trajectory for each S/A threat group k with Equation (4.17). Then,
the Markov chain is evaluated by solving the diﬀerential Equation (B.3) for each
possible location of each S/A threat unit j. The expected probabilities of successful
interception are then determined with Equation (4.20) for each S/A threat unit j,
and then the probability of one or more S/A threat units successfully intercept-
ing the A/G weapon is calculated with Equation (4.21). Finally, the survivability
of each trajectory is determined with Equation (4.22). The survivabilities of the
trajectories are then compared and the trajectory with the highest survivability is
identiﬁed as the best trajectory regarding the A/G weapon's survivability.
34
Chapter 5
Reference survivability models
The Markov survivability model introduced in Chapter 4 is veriﬁed to ensure that the
model indeed portrays the accumulation of risk while an A/G weapon is traversing a
given trajectory. This is done by comparing the survivability along the trajectories
based on the Markov model with the survivabilities based on two reference models.
The ﬁrst of the reference models is a survivability model introduced by Erlandson
and Niklasson [11]. The model relies on Markov chains to determine the survivability
of A/G weapons. This model is referred to as the Erlandsson model. The second
model aspires to capture the technical aspects of how a radar system acquires and
maintains a track of a target [34]. The second model is referred to as the technical
survivability model.
5.1 Erlandsson model
The Erlandsson model relies on ﬁve state continuous-time Markov chains to deter-
mine the likelihood of an A/G weapon being able to safely traverse the trajectory
and reach its target, i.e., its survivability. The capabilities of the S/A threat groups
are studied with N separate Markov chains. The Erlandsson model assigns a sensor
area for each target acquisition radar i and a threat area for each threat unit j in
S/A threat group k. The sensor areas represent areas in which the target acquisition
radars i = 1...nk are capable of detecting and tracking the A/G weapon, and the
threat areas represent areas in which the S/A threat units j = 1...mk can detect
and track the A/G weapon with their ﬁre control radars and are also capable of
engaging the A/G weapon with their weapons. The Erlandsson model does not take
into account the directional dependency of the A/G weapon's radar cross section or
the possible shadows caused by the terrain, as the radars' and weapons' capabilities
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to detect, track, and engage the A/G weapon are assumed to be constant within
each sensor and threat area.
The Erlandsson model uses continuous-time Markov chains with ﬁve states to
describe the capabilities of S/A threat groups k = 1...N . It is assumed that the
transitions between states are Poisson processes. Markov chains are described in
more detail in Appendix B. The states are Undetected, Detected, Tracked,
Engaged, and Hit. The transition rates between the states depend on which
sensor and/or threat areas the A/G weapon is located in, if any. The Markov chain
which is used is shown in Figure 5.1, with the positive non-zero transition rates in
each diﬀerent area depicted with arrows between the states.
While being in the Undetected state the S/A threat group k has not yet de-
tected the A/G weapon. The Detected state is a state where the threat group's
target acquisition radars i = 1...nk have detected the A/G weapon but not with
suﬃcient accuracy to form a track. Once in the Tracked state the S/A threat
group's target acquisition radars i = 1...nk have acquired suﬃcient knowledge on
the whereabouts of the A/G weapon to form a track. The track can then be handed
over to the threat units j = 1...mk. After the track formed by the target acquisition
radars i = 1...nk has been forwarded to the threat units j = 1...mk, the ﬁre control
radars of the threat units try to obtain their own tracks of the A/G weapon which
could be used by their weapons. Once this track has been formed by a threat unit j
in the S/A threat group, the state of the S/A threat group k advances to Engaged.
Finally, the state of the threat group k is changed to Hit once a threat unit j from
the group has succeeded in engaging the A/G weapon and the A/G weapon has
been intercepted.
The transition rates between states depend in what area or which diﬀerent areas
the A/G weapon is located in at any given time. Examples of transition rates
between diﬀerent states when the A/G weapon is outside all of the sensor and threat
areas and when the A/G weapon is in exactly one sensor or threat area are given
in Table 5.1. The values of state transition rates are calculated by ﬁrst determining
the mean time needed for a given transition and then calculating the reciprocal of
these mean times. The mean time needed for a given transition is determined with
the help of experts.
In many cases, the A/G weapon is in the sensor or threat areas of several diﬀer-
ent target acquisition radars i and threat units j of the same S/A threat group k
simultaneously. In such cases, the state transition rates are calculated based on the
transition rates of the individual sensor and threat areas. The combined transition
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Figure 5.1: The Markov chain used in the Erlandsson model, with arrows depicting
positive non-zero transition rates between states in given areas.
Table 5.1: State transition rates used by Erlandsson [11].
λU,D λD,U λD,T λT,D λT,E λE,T λE,H
Outside 0 0.2 0 0.2 0 1 0
Sensor area 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 0 1 0
Threat area 0 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3
rates are calculated in a slightly diﬀerent manner depending on the transition in
question. In the case that two or more sensor areas are overlapping, the Erlandsson
model assumes that each radar independently strives to detect and track the A/G
weapon, and the Markov chain transitions to the next state once the ﬁrst sensor
has detected the A/G weapon or acquired a track, depending on the state transi-
tion under inspection. Thus, the transitions from Undetected to Detected and
from Detected to Tracked are viewed as sums of multiple independent Poisson
processes. The transition rate of the combined Poisson process is calculated as the
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sum of the transition rates of the independent Poisson processes, i.e.,
λCombU,D =
nk∑
i=1
λiU,D (5.1)
λCombD,T =
nk∑
i=1
λiD,T , (5.2)
where λiU,D and λ
i
D,T are the transition rates from states Undetected to Detected
and Detected to Tracked in the ith individual sensor area respectively. The
derivation of transition rates for the opposite transitions, i.e., transitions from states
Detected to Undetected and from Tracked to Detected, is inspired by relia-
bility theory and the overlapping areas are described as parallel components such
that each component has an exponentially distributed life time. In other words, in
order for a state transition to happen each of the target acquisition radars i = 1...nk
and threat units j = 1...mk in the vicinity must have lost track of the A/G weapon.
From reliability theory it is known that with two parallel components the Poisson
process parameter λ describing the reliability of the complete system is determined
with
1
λ1,2
=
1
λ1
+
1
λ2
− 1
λ1 + λ2
, (5.3)
where λ1 and λ2 are the Poisson process parameters of each individual component.
As there are often more than two sensor or threat areas overlapped, Equation (5.3)
is inadequate for determining the ﬁnal transition rate. If there are more than two
overlapped areas, the ﬁnal transition rates are calculated by starting with the tran-
sition rate due to one sensor or threat area, and adding areas and sensors which are
taken into account one at a time. Given a set S of sensor and threat areas for which
the transition rates λSD,U and λ
S
T,D are known, the transition rates for the set of areas
S ∪ {i}, which is achieved by adding a sensor area i to the set S, are determined
with
1
λ
S∪{i}
D,U
=
1
λSD,U
+
1
λiD,U
− 1
λSD,U + λ
i
D,U
(5.4)
1
λ
S∪{i}
T,D
=
1
λST,D
+
1
λiT,D
− 1
λST,D + λ
i
T,D
. (5.5)
Threat areas j = 1...mk are treated in exactly the same manner as sensor areas i =
1...nk in Equations (5.4) and (5.5) when taking them into account in the transition
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rates λCombD,U and λ
Comb
T,D .
Overlapping threat areas and corresponding transition rates from state Tracked
to Engaged, from Engaged to Hit, and from Engaged to Tracked are deter-
mined in a diﬀerent manner than the transition rates discussed earlier. Erlandsson
argues that the decision of engaging the A/G weapon is made by the enemy com-
mander. Thus, the number of threat areas that overlap on the given location does
not explicitly have any eﬀect on the decision. In the Erlandsson model, the transi-
tion rates used for the aforementioned transitions are chosen to be the worst case
rates chosen from all overlapping areas, i.e.,
λCombT,E = max
j=1...mk
λjT,E (5.6)
λCombE,H = max
j=1...mk
λjE,H (5.7)
λCombE,T = min
j=1...mk
λjE,T , (5.8)
where λjT,E, λ
j
E,H , and λ
j
E,T are the transition rates between states Tracked, En-
gaged, and Hit in each individual overlapping threat area. The transition rate
away from the state Hit is always zero and this is an absorbing state.
It remains to determine the size of the sensor and threat areas. Erlandsson does
not specify any method on how the sizes of the diﬀerent areas should be determined.
In this thesis, the size of the sensor and threat areas are determined by the radar's
capability to detect the A/G weapon and the range Rmax of the weapon of the S/A
threat unit j. The maximum range at which a radar can detect the A/G weapon is
solved from Equation (A.8):
ρmax =
4
√
PtGtGrλ2στnp
(4pi)3LskT0F SNRmin
, (5.9)
where SNRmin is the minimum signal-to-noise ratio at which it has been determined
the radar can with a given certainty detect the A/G weapon. To calculate this, a
threshold probability of detection PD,min must be chosen. With the chosen threshold
probability of detection, the minimum detectable signal-to-noise ratio is determined
by using Equation (A.18). The maximum range ρmax calculated for a target acqui-
sition radar i with Equation (5.9) is used as the radius of the corresponding sensor
area. The radius of a threat area is chosen to be either the range Rmax of the S/A
threat's weapon or the maximum range ρmax of the associated ﬁre control radar,
which ever is smaller.
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When uncertainty concerning the location of the sensors and weapons is taken
into consideration, the expected values of the state transition rates for individual
sensor and weapon areas are used to determine the combined state transition rates
λCombU,D , λ
Comb
D,T , etc. For example, consider a target acquisition radar i for which
based on the probability map calculated for the radar it is determined that with
probability p the A/G weapon is in the target acquisition radar's sensor area. Then,
the resulting transition rate is calculated as
λ = pλsensor + (1− p)λout, (5.10)
where λsensor is the transition rate for the single target acquisition radar i when the
A/G weapon is inside the sensor area and λout is the transition rate when the A/G
weapon is outside the sensor area.
This method for determining the transition rate λ under uncertainty regarding
the locations of S/A threats is illustrated with an example portrayed in Figure 5.2.
In the example, the probability map consists of three alternative locations for the
S/A threat (x1, y1), (x2, y2) and (x3, y3). The S/A threat is located at each of the
locations with probabilities PL(x1, y1) = 1/4, PL(x2, y2) = 1/4 and PL(x3, y3) = 1/2.
Three separate positions are considered for the A/G weapon, these are denoted with
A, B and C. The maximum range of the S/A threat is denoted with ρmax. In position
A, the probability whereby the A/G weapon is inside the threat's sensor area is
p(A) = 0, thus based on Equation (5.10) the transition rate is λ = λout. In position
B, the probability of being inside the sensor area is p(B) = 3/4. Thus, in this case
the transition rate would be λ = 3/4 λsensor + 1/4 λout. Finally, in position C, the
probability p(C) is 1/4, and thus the transition rate is λ = 1/4 λsensor + 3/4 λout.
When evaluating the possible trajectories of an A/G weapon, a continuous-time
Markov chain is evaluated over the course of the trajectory for each S/A threat
group k by solving the diﬀerential equation given by Equation (B.3). Solving the
diﬀerential equation results in probabilities for being in each of the states Unde-
tected, Detected, Tracked, Engaged, and Hit at any given time t. For each
of these S/A threat groups k, the ﬁnal probability of successful interception P khit
is determined by reading the probability of being in state Hit at the end of the
trajectory. The probability that one or more S/A threat groups are successful in
intercepting the A/G weapon is calculated as
Pkill = 1−
N∏
k=1
(1− P khit), (5.11)
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Figure 5.2: The example with which the calculation of transition rate λ under
uncertainty is demonstrated.
in which P khit is the probability whereby the kth S/A threat group successfully in-
tercepts the A/G weapon, i.e., the probability that the group k is in state Hit at
the end of the A/G weapon's trajectory.
The ﬁnal survivability Psurv of the A/G weapon is determined by calculating
the complement probability of the event that one or more of the S/A threat groups
successfully intercept the A/G weapon, i.e.,
Psurv = 1− Pkill, (5.12)
As mentioned earlier, solving the diﬀerential equation (B.3) produces the prob-
abilities for the S/A threat group k to be in each of the states at any given time
t, i.e., the state probabilities. The state probabilities of each of the k = 1...N S/A
threat groups are combined to determine the probabilities that one or more threat
groups k have successfully intercepted the A/G weapon, i.e., Pkill(t). Additionally
probabilities that, for instance, one or more S/A threat groups k have advanced to
state Engaged" but no S/A threat group k has yet successfully intercepted the A/G
weapon can be calculated.
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In the special case that exact locations for the S/A threat systems are known, the
probability maps used to determine the state transition rates of single S/A threat
systems in Equation (5.10) are simpliﬁed to equal one in the location where the S/A
is located and zero elsewhere.
With the exception of probability maps used with the Erlandsson survivability
model, it does not take into account any topological features of the surrounding
terrain or the tree cover height. Due to this feature, the Erlandsson model might
give relatively small survivabilities for trajectories which use shadows cast by the
terrain to evade the S/A threat systems.
5.2 Technical model
The technical survivability model strives to take into account the technical aspects
and requirements for detections needed to form and maintain a track of an A/G
weapon by a radar sensor [34]. Similar to the other models discussed in this thesis,
the technical survivability model also distinguishes target acquisition, ﬁre control
track formation and track maintenance while intercepting the A/G weapon as the
distinct stages of the process leading from the ﬁrst detection of the A/G weapon to
its successful interception. Unlike in the other models discussed in this thesis, track
formation is not assumed to be a Poisson process but instead a Bernoulli process
which lasts a predetermined length of time and for which the outcome probabilities
depend on the probabilities of detection by the radars under consideration. As
the outcome probabilities of the successful track formation processes depend on the
detection probabilities of the radars, the model takes into account the directional
dependencies of the A/G weapon's radar cross section as well as any possible shadows
cast by the terrain. Unlike the other survivability models studied in this thesis which
are time-continuous, the technical survivability model addresses time in discrete time
steps. The time discretisation step size is denoted by ∆t.
In order to determine the probability of the A/G weapon's successful intercep-
tion by the S/A defence, the technical survivability model separately calculates two
distinct probabilities each of whom describes the probability of success in diﬀer-
ent stages of the process of intercepting the A/G weapon. The probabilities which
are calculated are the probability of a track successfully being formed by the tar-
get acquisition radars i = 1...nk of each threat group k denoted by (P kTA) and the
probability that the ﬁre control radar of each threat unit j = 1...mk is capable of
maintaining the track long enough to successfully intercept the A/G weapon with
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the S/A threat unit's weapon denoted by (P kTM,j). The probability that a single
chain of events which begins from the ﬁrst detection by the target acquisition radars
i = 1...nk of threat group k leads to the S/A threat unit j successfully intercepting
the A/G weapon is calculated as
P kintrcpt,j = P
k
TA × P kTM,j × Pmissile, (5.13)
where Pmissile is the probability that an S/A threat successfully intercepts the A/G
weapon, given that the A/G weapon has been successfully tracked by the target
acquisition radars and the ﬁre control radar of the S/A threat unit is capable of
maintaining the track for a suﬃcient length of time.
The technical survivability model assumes that when in search mode, the radar
sensors scan the airspace around them in an organised fashion. The scan time Tscan
is the time in which the searching radar scans the entire search area. Thus, the
interval at which the radar is capable of detecting the A/G weapon is Tscan. It is
assumed that in order for the target acquisition radar i to achieve a track of the A/G
weapon, it must detect the A/G weapon on Ntrack subsequent scans. The probability
that the radar sensor successfully detects the A/G weapon on any single attempt is
determined as described in Appendix A. The process of forming a track of the A/G
weapon by a searching target acquisition radar i is portrayed in Figure 5.3. In order
for the target acquisition radar i to obtain a track of the A/G weapon at time t, the
ﬁrst detection of the A/G weapon must be achieved at time t− (Ntrack − 1)Tscan.
In order to take into consideration the uncertainty regarding the locations of the
target acquisition radar i, the probability of successfully forming a track of the A/G
weapon at time t is ﬁrst determined for every possible location (x, y) of the target
acquisition radar i. The probability that the target acquisition radar i at location
(x, y) achieves a track of the A/G weapon at time t, i.e., it detects the A/G weapon
for the ﬁrst time at time t− (Ntrack−1)Tscan and is consequently able to successfully
detect the A/G weapon on N subsequent scans, is calculated with
P
(x,y)
track (t) =
∆t
Tscan
Ntrack∏
n=1
P
(x,y)
D (tn), (5.14)
in which ∆t is the time discretisation step and P (x,y)D (tn) is the probability that the
target acquisition radar located at (x, y) is able to detect the A/G weapon at time tn
(see Equation (A.18)). The probability that the searching target acquisition radar
is scanning in the direction of the A/G weapon at times t− (n− 1)Tscan is ∆t/Tscan.
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Given the time t when the track is successfully formed, the times tn at which the
target acquisition radar must have detected the A/G weapon to form the track are
tn = t− (Ntrack − n)Tscan, (5.15)
where Ntrack is the amount of number of detections needed to form a track. The
...
PD,TAR(t1) PD,TAR(t2) PD,TAR(t3) PD,TAR(t4) PD,TAR(tN)
Tscan Tscan Tscan
∆t
Figure 5.3: The process of forming a track of the A/G weapon by a target acquisition
radar.
probabilities of successfully forming a track from the diﬀerent possible locations are
then combined with the probability map P kL,i(x, y) calculated with Equation (4.3)
to form the expected probability of successfully forming a track for the target ac-
quisition radar i at time t:
E
[
P ktrack,i(t)
]
=
∑
(x,y)
P kL,i(x, y)P
(x,y)
track (t), (5.16)
where the superscript i refers to the ith target acquisition radar in a given S/A
threat group k. Further, the probability that one or more target acquisition radars
in the S/A threat group k successfully achieve a track of the A/G weapon at time
t is determined by
P kTA(t) = 1−
nk∏
i=1
(
1− E [P ktrack,i(t)]) , (5.17)
in which nk is the number of target acquisition radars in the given S/A threat group
k.
Once the target acquisition radars have achieved the track of the A/G weapon,
the track is handed over to the threat units j = 1...mk of the S/A threat group k.
The ﬁre control radars of the threat units operate with a diﬀerent principle than
the searching target acquisition radars. Once the track has been handed over to an
S/A threat unit j, the threat unit's ﬁre control radar proceeds to concentrate all of
its eﬀorts to detect the A/G weapon at the location determined by the track it was
given. The frequency at which the ﬁre control radar attempts to detect the A/G
44
weapon is referred to as the pulse repetition frequency PRF . The interval between
two detection attempts is referred to as the pulse repetition time PRT = PRF−1. In
order to maintain the track, the ﬁre control radar must successfully detect the A/G
weapon at least once during each track maintenance period Tmaint. Thus, the ﬁre
control radar has M = PRF × Tmaint attempts during each maintenance period to
detect the A/G weapon before the track is lost. Furthermore, the track must often
be maintained for a period longer than the maintenance period Tmaint in order to
successfully intercept the A/G weapon. This period during which the A/G weapon
must be tracked corresponds to the time taken to acquire the track by the ﬁre control
radar, the time needed to aim the S/A threat's weapon, and the ﬂight time of the
missile or other A/G weapon used to intercept the A/G weapon, all combined. This
time period is denoted by Ttrack.
To take in consideration uncertainties concerning the location of an S/A threat
unit j, the probability of successfully maintaining the track for the complete required
period of Ttrack is calculated for every possible location (x, y) of the S/A threat
unit j. First, the probability of successfully maintaining the track for a single track
maintenance period Tmaint is determined. The probability that a track is maintained
for the duration of the track maintenance period beginning at time t by a ﬁre control
radar located at coordinates (x, y) is calculated as
P
(x,y)
maint(t) = 1−
M∏
m=1
(
1− P (x,y)D (tm)
)
, (5.18)
in which tm is the time of the mth attempt to detect the A/G weapon, i.e., tm =
t + (m − 1)PRT , and P (x,y)D (tm) is calculated with Equation (A.18). Furthermore,
the probability that a ﬁre control radar at location (x, y) is able to maintain the
track for the whole period of length Ttrack starting at time t is determined by
P
(x,y)
TM (t) =
K∏
κ=1
P
(x,y)
maint(tκ), (5.19)
where Pmaint is calculated with Equation (5.18), K is the number of track mainte-
nance periods that are included in the time period Ttrack, and tκ refers to the time
at which the κth track maintenance period begins, i.e., tκ = t+ (κ− 1)Tmaint. Now
the expected probability of S/A threat unit j of S/A threat group k successfully
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maintaining the track of the A/G weapon is calculated with
E
[
P kTM,j(t)
]
=
∑
(x,y)
P kL,j(x, y)P
(x,y)
TM (t), (5.20)
where probability map P kL,j(x, y) gives the probability that S/A threat unit j is
located at location (x, y) and is calculated with Equation (4.3).
By substituting Equations (5.17) and (5.20) into Equation (5.13), the probability
that the single chain of events leads to the S/A threat unit j successfully intercepting
the A/G weapon at time t is
P kintrcpt,j(t) = P
k
TA(t− Ttrack)× E
[
P kTM,j(t− Ttrack)
]× Pmissile, (5.21)
where Pmissile is the probability that the S/A weapon is successful in intercepting the
A/G weapon assuming that the target acquisition radars i = 1...nk have successfully
formed the track of the A/G weapon and the ﬁre control radar of the ﬁre control
unit j has been able to maintain the track for the time needed for the S/A weapon
to intercept the A/G weapon. Equation (5.21) describes the probability that the
given threat unit j succeeds in intercepting the A/G weapon at time t assuming
that the threat unit has not intercepted the A/G weapon at an earlier point in time.
The probability for the given threat unit j to intercept the A/G weapon speciﬁcally
at time t is calculated by
P khit,j(t) = P
k
intrcpt,j(t)×
t−1∏
n=1
(
1− P kintrcpt,j(n)
)
. (5.22)
Using Equation (5.22), the probability that the A/G weapon is intercepted by S/A
threat unit j of S/A threat group k at any point on the trajectory is determined
with
P khit,j = 1−
Ntrajectory∏
t=1
P khit,j(t), (5.23)
where Ntrajectory is the number of time discretisation steps needed to traverse the
entire trajectory.
With Equation (5.23), the probability that the A/G weapon is intercepted on
the given trajectory by any of the S/A threat units j = 1...mk of any of the S/A
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threat groups k = 1...N is determined with
Pkill = 1−
N∏
k=1
mk∏
j=1
(
1− P khit,j
)
, (5.24)
where N is the number of S/A threat groups and mk is the quantity of S/A threat
units in threat group k. Finally, the survivability of the trajectory is determined
with
Psurv = 1− Pkill, (5.25)
where Pkill is calculated with Equation (5.24).
In case the exact locations of S/A threat systems are known, the technical sur-
vivability model is used in a similar fashion, only the probability maps P kL,i and P
k
L,j
diﬀer. If the exact locations of the S/A threat systems are known, the probabil-
ity maps used in Equations (5.16) and (5.20) are simpliﬁed so that the probability
map equals one at the location in which the S/A threat system is located and zero
elsewhere.
The technical survivability model takes into account the topological features of
terrain and possible tree cover in a similar way as the Markov survivability model.
In addition to the probability map, any possible topological features and tree cover
are taken into account in the calculation of the probabilities of detection P (x,y)D (t)
used in Equations (5.18) and (5.14) so that if there are visual obstructions due to
the terrain or the trees, the probability of detection is zero.
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Chapter 6
Numerical experiments
In this chapter, the trajectory evaluation framework introduced in Chapter 4 is
tested to ensure results given by the framework in whole and its parts alone produce
reasonable outcomes. In Chapter 6.1, the spatial prediction model is tested with a
case set in the area surrounding Otaniemi in Espoo, Finland. A probability map
is produced for a single S/A threat system and the probability map is inspected
to ensure that it is reasonable and coincides with reality. Next, the probability
map reduction method presented in Chapter 4.1.2 is inspected with two test cases
in Chapter 6.2. The aim is to prove that the probability map reduction method
preserves the characteristics which are important related to the survivability of tra-
jectories reﬂected by the original probability map, i.e., the expected probabilities of
detection. In Chapters 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, the Markov survivability model is compared
with the reference survivability models. The models are compared with respect to
the consistency of their results versus the results of other models, and the results are
also evaluated with intuition and common sense. In Chapter 6.3.1, the robustness
of the models in respect to uncertainty regarding the locations of S/A threat sys-
tems is inspected with the aim to show that the Markov model handles uncertainty
well. Here the robustness of the models portrays the models' abilty to preserve
the threat ordering of trajectories based while degree of uncertainty regarding the
locations of S/A threats is varied. The survivabilities of drastically diﬀerent tra-
jectories provided by the Markov survivability model and the reference models are
studied in Chapter 6.3.2. The purpose of Chapter 6.3.2 is to show that the Markov
survivability model gives reasonable results even with extreme trajectories.
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6.1 Illustration of spatial prediction model
The usage of the spatial prediction model is demonstrated with an example scenario,
for which data sets are shown in Figure 6.1. The direction from which an attack is
anticipated is north. In order to form the probability map, the passability, visibility,
(a) Map of the area. (b) Digital elevation model.
(c) CORINE land cover 2006. (d) Forest cover height
Figure 6.1: Data sets used in the spatial prediction model.
and grouping indices are calculated for each location. These indices are calculated
with Equations (4.4), (4.8) and (4.14), respectively. The intermediate results needed
to determine the indices, i.e., the slope angle and coeﬃcient, the velocity at which
an S/A threat can traverse the terrain, the time needed to reach any given location,
and average visibility from any given location are shown in Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and
6.5.
The passability, visibility, and grouping indices are shown in Figure 6.6. The
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(b) Slope coeﬃcient (Cslope).
Figure 6.2: Slope angle and coeﬃcient for the area of the example scenario with
parameters Φlow = 10◦ and Φhigh = 20◦.
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Figure 6.3: Velocity at which it is possible to traverse the terrain (km/h).
passability index (Fig. 6.6a) is given the value 1 for all locations that can be reached
without crossing water. This is because all such locations in the area of the example
scenario can be reached in a reasonable amount of time. If the area was larger, some
areas might possibly be discarded, i.e., the passability index would be zero, since it
would be impossible for threat systems to reach them in the given time frame.
Looking at the visibility index (Fig. 6.6b), one notices that the visibility index is
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Figure 6.4: Time needed to navigate to any certain location in hours. The depot
from which the threat systems spread out is marked with a red cross.
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Figure 6.5: Average visibility in metres to an altitude of 150 metres above sea level
when facing north in a 120 degree wide sector.
close to 1 at large expanses such as the bay in the area of the example scenario. The
visibility index value decreases when the northern shore of the bay is approached.
This is because in the example scenario the direction from which an attack is being
anticipated is north and as the northern shore is approached the visibility north
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deteriorates. The visibility index is also greater in areas that are higher than the
surrounding terrain and which do not have a lot of tree coverage. This is logical
since from such locations the visibility is generally good.
The grouping index is portrayed in Figure 6.6c. The target which is being de-
fended is marked with a red cross.
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(c) The grouping index.
Figure 6.6: Diﬀerent indices from which the probability map is formed.
The resulting probability map is shown in Figure 6.7. Again, the target which
is being defended is marked with a red cross. Reﬂecting on the actual terrain, the
resulting probability map seems plausible. The locations where a high probability
is given for the threat system to be situated are mostly locations with little or no
tree coverage and often on top of hills.
An actual view from a location where the probability map gives a relatively high
probability for a threat system to be located is shown in Figure 6.8. The view
is facing north from the location marked with a red circle in Figure 6.7. As the
photograph in Figure 6.8 is taken from a car, it is safe to say that the location is
easily accessible. The visibility from the given location is also excellent, which is
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Figure 6.7: The probability map.
Figure 6.8: View from a highly probable location (source: Google Maps).
seen from Figure 6.8. The location in question should be a good location for the
S/A threat system to operate, and thus it should be a location where it should be
expected that such a threat system could be stationed.
Further, the probability map reduction method is used to reduce the probability
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map shown in Figure 6.7 to 20 discrete locations. The ﬁrst six repetitions of the
Assignment and Update steps in the execution of the probability map reduction
method described in Chapter 4.1.2 with the probability map from the example
scenario are shown in Figure 6.9. The black dots indicate the positions of the set
prototypes at the beginning of each repetition and the red crosses mark the new
positions of the set prototypes into which they are moved in the Update step.
Figure 6.9: The ﬁrst six repetitions of the Assignment and Update steps in the
execution of the probability map reduction method.
The ﬁnal converged collection of sets, corresponding set prototypes and ﬁnal re-
duced locations for the example execution of the algorithm are shown in Figure 6.10.
The black dots in Figure 6.10 represent the ﬁnal set prototypes of the converged sets,
and the red crosses mark the reduced locations used as the reduced probability map.
Figure 6.10 implies that the resulting probability map is reasonable. The areas in
which the probability map gives a zero probability for an S/A threat unit to be
located are areas which are covered by water, i.e., in this case part of the Baltic
Sea. Thus, it would be impossible for the S/A threat systems in question to operate
there. As noted earlier with Figures 6.7 and 6.8, the areas which are highlighted
as likely locations are mostly locations with higher altitude than the surrounding
terrain and little or no tree cover. The reduced probability map highlights these
same areas with the ﬁnal reduced probability map locations.
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Figure 6.10: The ﬁnal converged locations sets, corresponding set prototypes and
ﬁnal reduced probability map locations.
6.2 Veriﬁcation of probability map reduction
Reduced probability maps produced by the probability map reduction method pre-
sented in Chapter 4.1.2 must be veriﬁed to make sure that they still approximate
the original probability maps regarding S/A threat systems' capabilities to detect
an A/G weapon with suﬃcient accuracy. To carry this out, the airspace around the
area described by the probability map is divided into a grid with horizontal edges
roughly one nautical mile and vertical edges roughly half a nautical mile long, and
the expected probability of detection is determined for an A/G weapon with diﬀer-
ent orientations in each grid based on the reduced probability maps with diﬀerent
cluster quantities. The cluster quantity corresponds with the number of possible dis-
crete locations into which the probability map is reduced. These expected detection
probabilities are compared with the expected probabilities of detection calculated
based on the original probability map.
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The expected probability of detection of an A/G weapon located at coordinates
(x, y, z), heading in direction φ with yaw angle θ and roll angle ψ is calculated with
E [PD(x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ)] =
∑
(x′,y′)
(
PL(x
′, y′)P (x
′,y′)
D (x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ)
)
, (6.1)
where P (x
′,y′)
D is the probability of detection for the A/G weapon by a sensor located
at coordinates (x′, y′) and is calculated with Equation (A.18) and PL(x′, y′) is the
probability map which is calculated with Equation (4.3). The probability of detec-
tion PD is dependent on all of the A/G weapon's six degrees of freedom because
the radar cross section of the A/G weapon changes depending on which part of the
weapon is facing the radar.
The diﬀerent orientations of the A/G weapon for which the probabilities of de-
tection are calculated at each grid location are shown in Figure 6.11. Diﬀerent grid
locations are marked in Figure 6.11 with dots, the left subﬁgure views the grid from
above and the right subﬁgure gives a horizontal view of the grid. The arrows in
the left subﬁgure of Figure 6.11 depict the diﬀerent heading angles φ for which the
expected probabilities of detection are calculated. The right subﬁgure of Figure 6.11
shows the diﬀerent pitch angles θ with which the expected detection probabilities
calculated based on the original and reduced probability map are compared. The
roll angle ψ is always set to be zero in the comparisons.
y
x
z
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Figure 6.11: Diﬀerent orientations of the A/G weapon for which the probabilities of
detection are calculated in each grid.
The expected probability of detection (6.1) is calculated at each grid location
with each orientation of the A/G weapon based on the original probability map and
the reduced probability maps with alternative cluster quantities. The residuals of
the expected probability of detection caused by the use of the reduced probability
map are calculated as the diﬀerence between the expected probability of detection
based on the original probability map and the expected probability of detection
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based on the reduced probability maps. Diﬀerent metrics are calculated based on
the residuals, and these are shown in Figure 6.12 as a function of the cluster quantity
used in the probability map reduction. The cluster quantity is the number of areas
the original probability map is divided into, and thus also the amount of ﬁnal reduced
probability map locations produced by the probability map reduction method. The
metrics are the mean of the residuals and the standard deviation of the residuals.
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Figure 6.12: Residual means and standard deviations of the expected probabilities
of detection based on the reduced probability map.
As seen from Figure 6.12, the mean of the residuals is close to zero even with very
small cluster quantities used in the probability map reduction. Thus, it can be said
that the approximated expected probabilities of detection are on average consistent
with the detection probabilities based on the original probability map even with very
few clusters being used in the reduction. However, with small cluster quantities there
is quite a lot of variance in the residuals, i.e., even though the approximated expected
detection probabilities are on average correct, individual approximated expected
probabilities deviate quite a lot from the expected probabilities of detection based
on the original probability map. As the number of clusters is increased, the variance
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and thus also the standard deviation of the residuals decreases rapidly. Based on
these observations, it is reasonable to conclude that the probability map reduction
method presented in this thesis approximates the probability map suﬃciently in
respect to the expected probabilities of detection when the cluster quantity is set to
be high enough.
6.3 Comparison of survivability models
The Markov survivability model presented in this thesis is veriﬁed and compared
against the reference survivability models, i.e., the Erlandsson model and the tech-
nical survivability model. The models are compared by evaluating trajectories with
each of the survivability models in two diﬀerent scenarios and inspecting the accu-
mulation of risk in diﬀerent models. The survivabilities of the trajectories are set
in priority order, with the best trajectory corresponding to the trajectory with the
greatest survivability. These orderings of the trajectories based on the survivability
models are then compared with each other. The models are compared with each
other regarding the consistency of the results between the models and also in regard
to common sense and reality. Also, the models' robustness is tested in respect to the
amount of uncertainty regarding the locations of S/A threat systems in the area,
i.e., how well the model retains the ordering of trajectories based on the trajectories'
survivabilities when location uncertainty is varied. The ﬁrst scenario is set around
Otaniemi in Espoo, Finland while the second scenario is set in the country around
and to the west of Hyvinkää, Finland.
In both scenarios, the S/A air defence strives to defend a single target. The S/A
air defence in each scenario consists of multiple S/A threat groups, each of which in
turn consists of four diﬀerent types of S/A threat systems: medium range S/A missile
systems, short range S/A missile systems, anti-aircraft guns and target acquisition
radars. The medium range S/A missile systems, the short range S/A missile systems
and the anti-aircraft guns are threat units and thus include in addition to the actual
S/A weapon a ﬁre control radar. The ranges Rmax of the medium range S/A missile
systems, the short range S/A missile systems and the anti-aircraft guns are 15 km,
5 km and 7 km, respectively. In the example scenarios, the S/A threat units diﬀer
from each other only by the eﬀective range of their weapons. In each of the radars,
the height of the radar hobv is 15 metres. The radio cross-section model used in
the example scenarios is a realistic model for an A/G weapon, with a mean radar
cross-section of about 5 m2 but a median radar cross-section of only about 0.1 m2.
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Thus, the radar cross-section of the A/G weapon is generally quite small. However,
it also has signiﬁcant spikes, corresponding to directions from which it is easy to
detect the A/G weapon.
A thorough listing of the parameters used in the example scenarios is given in
Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. The values of the state transition rates λ in Tables 6.1
and 6.2 can be thought of as the reciprocals of the actual times needed for the state
transfer in question. For example, if the time needed to form a track is on average
12 seconds, the state transition rate λU,T in the Markov survivability model is 1/12.
This corresponds to the parameters of the technical survivability model for which the
scan time Tscan is 6 seconds and the track criteria Ntrack is 2. Thus, the time needed
to form a track is 6 s × 2 = 12 s. Similarly, the average time taken to advance
from state Undetected" to Tracked" via the state Detected" in the Erlandsson
survivability model is 6s+ 6 s = 12 s. The threshold probability of detection PD,min
is set to be 0.8 for the Erlandsson survivability model. This threshold is used in
calculating the radii ρmax of the sensor and threat areas with Equation (5.9).
Table 6.1: Parameters of the Markov survivability model used in the example sce-
narios.
λU,T λT,U λT,L λL,T λ
const
L,H
1/12 1/5 1/6 1 1/10
Table 6.2: Parameters of the Erlandsson model used in the example scenarios.
λU,D λD,U λD,T λT,D λT,E λE,T λE,H
Outside 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Sensor area 1/6 0 1/6 0 0 1 0
Threat area 0 1 0 1 1/6 0 1/3
Table 6.3: Parameters of the technical model used in the example scenarios.
Time discretisation step (∆t) 1 s
Scan time (Tscan) 6 s
Track criteria (Ntrack) 2
Pulse repetition time (PRT ) 0.1 s
Maintenance period (Tmaint) 1 s
The accumulation of risk obtained with the survivability models is studied by
qualitative comparison of the threat proﬁles of trajectories, i.e., the state proba-
bilities at given time t achieved when solving the diﬀerential equation (B.3). The
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trajectories are ordered based on the survivabilities determined with each surviv-
ability model. Then, these orderings are compared. Also, each model's sensitivity
to uncertainty regarding the position of the S/A threat systems, i.e., how well each
model preserves the ordering of the trajectories based on each trajectory's surviv-
ability, is inspected by ﬁrst evaluating the trajectories based on exact locations
and gradually increasing the uncertainty of the S/A threat systems' positions while
evaluating each trajectory after every increment of the position uncertainty. The
uncertainty is increased by increasing the size of the area in which it is believed that
each S/A threat system is located. All of the trajectories studied in Chapters 6.3.1
and 6.3.2 are parabolic, i.e., air resistance is not taken into consideration. The hor-
izontal velocity of the A/G weapon is constant 350 m/s in every trajectory, and the
A/G weapon is initially in a purely horizontal motion.
6.3.1 Otaniemi scenario
The ﬁrst example scenario is set around Otaniemi in Espoo, Finland. The air
defence consists of four S/A threat groups, all of whom include a target acquisition
radar. Additionally, two of the S/A threat groups include four anti-aircraft guns
and one of the groups contains four short range S/A missile systems. One S/A
threat group contains a medium range S/A missile system. The grouping areas of
the diﬀerent S/A threat systems in each threat group are portrayed in Figure 6.13.
The grouping area of an S/A threat is a geographic area in which it is thought that
the S/A threat system is located. In the examples, the grouping index of the spatial
prediction model is set to be two-dimensional normal distributions deﬁned by the
grouping areas. The center of the grouping area corresponds to the expected value of
the a priori probability map, i.e., the grouping index in the spatial prediction model.
Similarly, the distance of the edges from the center of the grouping area corresponds
to one standard deviation in the grouping index of the spatial prediction model. The
relation between the grouping area of the S/A threat system, the expected location
of the S/A threat system and the standard deviations of the S/A threat system's
location are portrayed in Figure 6.14.
Three diﬀerent trajectories are evaluated with the Markov survivability model
and each of the reference models. The trajectories originate from an altitude of
about 10 kilometres and ultimately reach the target which is set in the middle of
Otaniemi in Espoo, Finland. The trajectories diﬀerentiate from each other only by
the direction from which they originate from. The ﬁrst trajectory begins north-west
from Otaniemi, the second begins north from Otaniemi while the third begins from
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Figure 6.13: The grouping areas of the S/A threat systems.
the north-east of Otaniemi. The trajectories are shown in Figure 6.15.
The locations of the S/A threat systems are assumed unknown and thus prob-
ability maps determined with the spatial prediction model are used to determine
the survivabilities over each trajectory. The resulting probability maps and resem-
ble that of the probability map shown in Figure 6.7. The survivabilities of the
trajectories are given in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Survivabilities (Psurv) of the trajectories in the Otaniemi scenario.
Trajectory 1 Trajectory 2 Trajectory 3
Markov model 0.33 0.20 0.28
Erlandsson model 0.79 0.74 0.79
Technical model 0.18 0.16 0.02
As seen in Table 6.4, all models evaluate trajectory 1 to be the best trajectory,
i.e., the trajectory with the highest survivability. Both the Markov survivability
model and the Erlandsson model evaluate trajectory 3 to be the second safest tra-
jectory but the technical model evaluates trajectory 2 to be the second safest. All of
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The grouping area of an S/A threat system
Figure 6.14: The expected location of an S/A threat system, the standard deviations
of the S/A threat system's location and the grouping area of the S/A threat system.
the models give consistent results concerning which trajectory is the best, i.e., has
the highest survivability.
In order to study the accumulation of risk while traversing a trajectory, stacked
area graphs are drawn to illustrate the state probabilities at any given point in
time. Such stacked area graphs are shown for trajectory 1 in Figure 6.16. The
areas in Figure 6.16 correspond to the probability that at least one Markov chain
has reached the state resembled by the area while no Markov chains have reached a
worse" state, i.e., a state further on in the chain. Each Markov chain corresponds
to either an S/A threat unit in the Markov survivability model and an S/A threat
group in the Erlandsson survivability model. Thus, the area corresponding to the
state Hit" in Figure 6.16 corresponds to the probability that one or more S/A
threat units have been able to successfully intercept the A/G weapon, i.e., Pkill.
The probability of the A/G weapon being succesfully intercepted at a given time
based on the technical survivability model is portrayed by the Pkill curve in the
bottommost plot of Figure 6.16.
As is seen from Figure 6.16, the Markov survivability model is quickest to react to
the threat and the survivability, i.e., the complement probability of the probability
of at least one Markov chain being in state Hit", begins to decrease after t = 10 s.
The reference models are slower to react to the S/A threat and both of them predict
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Figure 6.15: The trajectories under consideration. Trajectory 1 is marked with a
blue curve, trajectory 2 is marked with a red curve, and trajectory 3 is marked with
a black curve.
the survivability to begin decreasing after t = 20 s. Again, each of the models seems
to be consistent with each other in this example scenario. In each of the models the
probability of being intercepted by an S/A threat increases gradually towards the
end of the trajectory.
The models' sensitivity to uncertainty regarding the locations of the S/A threat
systems is studied by ﬁrst evaluating the survivabilities of the trajectories based on
the known locations of the S/A threat systems. Then, the locations' uncertainties
are gradually increased until the a priori knowledge of the threat systems' where-
abouts is described by the grouping areas given in Figure 6.13. The uncertainty
increased by increasing the size of the grouping areas in which the threat systems
are believed to reside, starting from grouping areas of only the known exact loca-
tions and ending in the grouping areas depicted in Figure 6.13. The uncertainty
regarding the location is characterised with location uncertainty η. The grouping
area with location uncertainty η is determined with the known location of the S/A
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Figure 6.16: Graphs of the state probabilities along trajectory 1 based on the Markov
survivability model, the Erlandsson model, and the technical model (top to bottom).
threat system and the original grouping area as shown in Figure 6.17. The location
uncertainty η = 0 depicts knowledge of exact locations and location uncertainty
η = 1 depicts grouping areas equal to those shown in Figure 6.13.
The known locations of the S/A threat systems are given in Figure 6.18. The
known locations are plausible locations in a sense that there is good visibility from
each location, each site is accessible by the threat systems and the locations are in
or very near to the grouping areas given in Figure 6.13.
The probability of the A/G weapon being intercepted on each trajectory Pkill,
i.e., 1 − Psurv, related to each trajectory is evaluated with location uncertainties η
ranging from 0 to 1. The survivabilities of the trajectories with diﬀerent location
uncertainties η are given in Figure 6.19. The Markov survivability model and the
Erlandsson model give relatively stable results even though the uncertainty regarding
the S/A threat systems' locations is increased, i.e., the ordering of the trajectories
based on their survivability does not often change. The results provided by the
technical model vary more than the results of the other models. The priority of the
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Grouping area with location uncertainty η 
Grouping area with location uncertainty η = 1 
Known location of S/A threat system 
Figure 6.17: The grouping area with location uncertainty η, where D1, D2, D3, and
D4 depict the distances from the known location of the S/A threat system to the
top right, bottom right, bottom left, and top left corners of the original grouping
area, respectively.
trajectories regarding their survivability changes multiple times during the course of
increasing the uncertainty when evaluating with the technical model while with the
Markov survivability model trajectory 1 remains the safest trajectory throughout
the process. Both the Markov survivability model and the Erlandsson model prove
to be robust regarding the amount of uncertainty as the ordering of trajectories
seldom change while the uncertainty is increased.
Based on the Otaniemi example scenario, the survivability models seem to be-
have consistently, i.e., all models evaluate trajectory 1 as the best, when uncertainty
regarding the locations of S/A threat systems is constant. However, once the un-
certainty is varied, diﬀerences between the two Markov chain based survivability
models and the technical survivability model become clear. The results of the tech-
nical survivability model prove to be unstable when the location uncertainty is varied
and thus the model would give diﬀerent results depending on how accurate infor-
mation regarding the locations of the S/A threat systems is available. Meanwhile,
the Markov chain based survivability models both produce relatively consistent sur-
vivabilities for the trajectories, which is seen in Figure 6.19. Based on the Otaniemi
example scenario not much can be said regarding the diﬀerences between the Markov
survivability model and the Erlandsson model. Both give similar results and are ro-
bust with respect to uncertainty regarding the locations of S/A threat units.
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Figure 6.18: The known locations with which the robustness of the survivability
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Figure 6.19: The probabilities Pkill of the trajectories with increasing uncertainty
regarding the locations of the S/A threat systems evaluated with the Markov sur-
vivability model, the Erlandsson model, and the technical model (top to bottom).
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6.3.2 Hyvinkää scenario
The second scenario in which the Markov survivability model is veriﬁed is set in
and to the west of Hyvinkää, Finland. The air defence is set up in three tiers, each
of which is designated as an independent S/A threat group. The westernmost S/A
threat group consists of a target acquisition radar and four anti-aircraft guns. The
middle S/A threat group contains a target acquisition radar and four short range S/A
missile systems. The easternmost S/A threat group consists of a target acquisition
radar and two medium range S/A missile systems. The assumed grouping areas of
the S/A threat systems are portrayed in Figure 6.20.
Figure 6.20: The grouping areas of the S/A threat systems.
Trajectories under consideration travel from west to east but start from diﬀerent
altitudes. The ﬁrst trajectory originates from an altitude of 15 kilometres, the
second starts from an altitude of 5 kilometres and the third begins from an altitude
of 500 metres. All of the trajectories originate from approximately 100 kilometres
west of the target.
Each trajectory is evaluated using the Markov survivability model and the ref-
erence models. Once again, the locations of the S/A threat systems are assumed
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to be unknown, and thus probability maps are determined for each threat system.
These probability maps are used as a basis for the trajectory evaluation. A com-
bined probability map similar to that related to the Hyvinkää scenario is given in
Figure 6.21. This map is a probability map which gives the probability that at least
one of many S/A threat systems in the area is located at any given location.
Figure 6.21: A combined probability map for S/A threat systems similar to that
used in the Hyvinkää scenario.
The survivabilities of theh trajectories are given in Table 6.5. The Markov sur-
vivability model estimates a high survivability for all trajectories while based the
reference models the survivabilities of each trajectory are low. Based on the Markov
model trajectory 1 is the best, while the technical model evaluates trajectory 3
to be preferrable. The Erlandsson model evaluates equal survivabilities for each
trajectory.
Table 6.5: Survivabilities (Psurv) of the trajectories in the Hyvinkää scenario.
Trajectory 1 Trajectory 2 Trajectory 3
Markov model 0.98 0.82 0.88
Erlandsson model 0.00 0.00 0.00
Technical model 0.04 0.00 0.07
The survivabilities determined for the trajectories in the Hyvinkää scenario
demonstrate the shortcomings of the implementation of the Erlandsson model used
in the example scenarios. The sensor and threat areas used in the Erlandsson model
are cylinders with radius ρmax in 3-dimensional space. Thus, the implementation
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of the Erlandsson model gives low survivabilities for trajectories at high altitudes,
even though the trajectories are at the very limits of the S/A weapons' capabilities,
i.e., the S/A weapons' range Rmax. Similarly, the implementation of the Erlandsson
model used in this thesis also provides low survivabilities for the trajectories at very
low altitudes as the Erlandsson model does not take into account any shadows cast
by the terrain. Thus, the implementation of the Erlandsson model assumes the S/A
threat systems are able to detect, track and engage the A/G weapon even though
the systems would not have been able to detect the A/G weapon or the S/A weapon
would not be able to engage the A/G weapon in reality. The technical survivability
model gives lower survivabilities than the Markov survivability model, but distin-
guishes between the trajectories at extreme altitudes and the trajectory within the
range of the S/A threat systems. Trajectory 2, which is at an altitude at which
the S/A threats can intercept it throughout the trajectory is evaluated the lowest
survivability by both the Markov model and the technical model.
The accumulation of risk is studied using a stacked area graph in which the areas
correspond to state probabilities at any given time. Such a stacked area graph is
provided in Figure 6.22 for trajectory 2. The risk caused by the diﬀerent S/A threat
groups is seen in the graphs. The ﬁrst S/A threat group is encountered around time
t = 100 s. At this point the Erlandsson model forecasts that the A/G weapon will
be intercepted almost certainly while the other models give a smaller probability of
interception at this point. The second S/A threat group is encountered at about
t = 200 s. The third S/A threat group can not be distinguished as clearly from
Figure 6.22, however the slight rise in probability of being in Locked state based
on the Markov model at time t = 250 s is due to this third threat group.
Unlike the Erlandsson model, the Markov survivability model and the technical
survivability model handle the range Rmax of the S/A weapons as the slant range
between the S/A weapon and the A/G weapon, i.e., the models takes into account
also the altitude diﬀerence. The Markov survivability model evaluates trajectory 1
to be the safest trajectory (see, Table 6.5). This is due to the maximum slant
range deﬁned within the model for the S/A weapons (the largest possible range is
Rmax = 15 km) and the fact that the trajectory is at such a high altitude (starting at
15 km). Therefore, almost all of the S/A weapons are out of the range throughout the
trajectory. The survivability based on the technical survivability model diﬀers from
the Markov survivability model's survivability mainly on how likely it determines for
the A/G weapon to be intercepted towards the end of its trajectory as is seen from
the steep rise of Pkill based on the technical model towards the end of the trajectory
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Figure 6.22: Graphs of the state probabilities along trajectory 2 based on the Markov
survivability model, the Erlandsson model, and the technical model (top to bottom).
in the bottommost plot of Figure 6.22. Based on the Markov survivability model the
A/G weapon is not as likely to be intercepted, even towards the end of its trajectory.
Based on the Hyvinkää scenario, the Markov survivability model is quite consis-
tent with the technical survivability model because were able to identify trajectory 2
as the worst trajectory, i.e., the trajectory with the lowest survivability. Trajectory 1
travels most of the distance at a high altitude and out of reach of all or most of
the S/A weapons. Onle at the ﬁnal stages if trajectory 1 the A/G weapon descends
to altitudes at which more S/A weapons can engage it. The technical survivability
model seems to emphasise the last stages of the trajectory when the A/G weapon
descends towards its target more than the Markov survivability model. Thus, the
technical survivability model gives trajectory 3 a lower survivability than trajec-
tory 1. Compared with trajectory 2, both the Markov survivability model and the
technical survivability model evaluate trajectory 3 to be safer. This is consistent
with common sense, as A/G weapons on low-ﬂying trajectories should be harder
to detect and engage due to shadows cast by the terrain. The implementation of
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the Erlandsson survivability model used in this thesis fails to detect any diﬀerences
between any of the trajectories in the Hyvinkää example scenario.
The following concludes the numerical experiments section of this thesis. The
spatial prediction model was seen to produce reasonable probability maps for S/A
threats in Chapter 6.1, and the probability map reduction method was seen to pre-
serve the characteristics which are important related to the survivability of trajecto-
ries in Chapter 6.2. In Chapter 6.3, the Markov survivability model was compared
with the reference survivability models in regard to the consistency of survivabil-
ities and the robustness of the models with respect to the amount of uncertainty
regarding the locations of the S/A threat systems. The Markov survivability model
both gives intuitive results and is robust with respect to the amount of location un-
certainty. The robustness of the Markov model was shown in Chapter 6.3.1, where
both the Markov survivability model and the Erlandsson survivability model were
noted to be robust while the technical survivability model changed the ordering of
trajectories based on the survivability numerous times as the location uncertainty
was varied. In Chapter 6.3.2, the Erlandsson survivability model was found to pro-
duce results inconsistent with reality in extreme cases, and the implementation of
the Erlandsson model which was used was unable to distinguish between any of the
trajectories evaluated. The Markov survivability model and the technical survivabil-
ity model both produced results consistent with common sense and intuition. To
summarise, the trajectory evaluation framework is capable of evaluating trajectories
under uncertainty regarding the locations of S/A threat systems of which the air
defence consists of. Based on intelligence information regarding the locations and
capabilities of S/A threat systems, the trajectory evaluation framework is used to
determine the best trajectory from a set of alternative trajectories.
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Chapter 7
Summary and discussion
This thesis introduces the novel trajectory evaluation framework for comparing tra-
jectories of A/G weapons based on the risk of being intercepted with an S/A threat
system. The risk is due to adverse S/A threats which try to intercept the A/G
weapon. The framework is used to facilitate decision making regarding route plan-
ning for A/G missions by identifying the trajectory on which the probability for the
A/G weapon to be intercepted with the S/A threats is the smallest. The frame-
work consists of the spatial prediction model and the Markov survivability model
developed in this thesis.
The spatial prediction model is used to build a probability map for an S/A threat
system. Such a system is a target acquisition radar or an S/A threat unit which
consists of a radar and an S/A weapon. The probability map is constructed by
using geographical data and knowledge about common tactical principles applied in
forming air defence. The model is based on sound observations on the requirements
of the terrain where the S/A threat system is capable of operating eﬀectively. It
also takes into account available intelligence information on the grouping of the S/A
threat systems and their capabilities. Thus, the resulting probability map concisely
describes the available information concerning the positioning of the S/A threat
system in any region. To the knowledge of the author, no similar spatial models
have been published prior to this thesis.
Probability maps produced by the spatial prediction model are used for estimat-
ing threat induced by a known amount of S/A threat systems in a given area onto an
A/G weapon which is the approach applied in the trajectory evaluation framework.
Results obtained with the model can also be used as an a priori estimate for the
locations of the S/A threat systems when building a probability map with data from
noisy radar sensing sensors [17].
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It should be noted that due to lack of data, the spatial prediction model does not
take into account buildings and their eﬀect on the capability of S/A threat systems
to operate. Especially in populated areas, buildings can account for a great amount
of visual obstructions. Since the populated areas also often have less tree growth, the
model gives unrealistically great probabilities for S/A threat systems to be located
in the built areas. In reality, it might be impossible for the S/A threat systems to
operate with buildings in the immediate vicinity. Nevertheless, given data regarding
the dimensions and locations of the buildings the model could easily be extended to
take into account these buildings.
The Markov survivability model introduced in this thesis provides survivabilities
of A/G weapons' trajectories by taking into account the directional radar cross-
section of an A/G weapon and possible terrain shadow eﬀects. Compared with
the implementation of the Erlandsson model [11] used in this thesis, the Markov
survivability model is more accurate, as the Erlandsson model does not treat the
directional radar cross-section and shadows cast by the terrain. As the technical
survivability model [34] is directly derived from technical requirements and work-
ing principles of radars and trackers, the relative survivabilities of the trajectories
obtained with it should be closest to reality. However, as demonstrated in Chap-
ter 6.3, these survivabilities are sensitive to uncertainties regarding the locations of
S/A threat systems. On the other hand, the Markov survivability is robust, i.e.,
the relative survivabilities of the trajectories do not change even though uncertainty
regarding the S/A threat systems' locations is varied. To summarise, the Markov
survivability model gives credible relative survivabilities while being immune to in-
creasing uncertainty regarding the locations of the threats.
Similar to the Erlandsson model, the Markov survivability model contains a set
of parameters. The parameters are state transition intensities which are derived
from the mean time needed for any given state transfer such as the time needed to
form a track. These in turn can be deﬁned by experts. The technical survivability
model relies on more precise information regarding radars. This includes the track
criterion on how many detections must be achieved to form a track and the track
maintenance period during which at least one successful detection must be made
to maintain an earlier track. These parameters have a large eﬀect on the results of
evaluations performed by the model. Furthermore, the Markov survivability model
and the Erlandsson model can be extended to take into account infrared and optical
sensors. The technical survivability model, on the other hand, is speciﬁcally derived
from radar sensors, and thus a completely separate model must be constructed to
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describe diﬀerent types of sensors.
The Markov and Erlandsson survivability models rely on continuous-time Markov
chains, and thus state probabilities are treated with diﬀerential equations. This can
be useful in future endeavours when optimising the trajectories of A/G weapons.
The same cannot be said of the technical survivability model in which the accumu-
lation of risk is not deﬁned in a similar elegant manner.
The motivation behind this thesis was the need to evaluate the relative survivabil-
ities of alternative trajectories in situations where an A/G weapon traverses through
airspace controlled by adverse air defence and the exact locations of S/A threat sys-
tems are not known. With the novel trajectory evaluation framework introduced
in this thesis, the trajectories are evaluated which reveals the trajectory with the
greatest survivability. The Markov survivability model used in the framework is well
suitable for situations in which there is uncertainty regarding the locations of the
S/A threat systems. With the spatial prediction model, intelligence information on
the locations of the S/A threats is enhanced and probability maps that are applied
with the Markov survivability model are produced.
The trajectory evaluation framework extends and complements the tool called
Strike Aircraft Routing Software Suite presented in the master's thesis Military air-
craft routing with multi-objective network optimizations and simulation [28]. The
tool is used to create A/G mission scenarios that are analysed for determining op-
timal military aircraft routing. The spatial prediction and the Markov survivability
models are implemented as subprograms within the tool. With the framework, the
survivability of an A/G weapon can also be taken into account in military aircraft
routing analysis.
Future research dealing with the grouping of S/A threats should take into account
the interdependencies of the positioning of multiple S/A threat systems. In the
trajectory evaluation framework, it is assumed that the S/A threat systems are
located independently of each other. This assumption does not generally hold. The
relations between the multiple systems and the eﬀect of these relations on probability
maps and trajectory evaluation should be studied. On the other hand, the Markov
survivability model is only capable of handling radar sensors. It could be augmented
to also treat diﬀerent types of sensors such as infrared and optical sensors. Such
sensors have a signiﬁcant role in short range air defence and thus should not be
disregarded.
Overall, the trajectory evaluation framework at hand is used to solve the tra-
jectory planning problem of A/G weapons by identifying the trajectory with the
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greatest survivability from a set of possible trajectories which penetrate into airspace
defended by adverse air defence. The next step would be to properly optimise the
trajectory of an A/G weapon using dynamic optimisation [5] or optimal control
theory [22]. The solution of such a trajectory planning problem would provide the
optimal trajectory which maximises the survivability of the A/G weapon.
75
Bibliography
[1] M. Austin. Spatial prediction of species distribution: an interface between
ecological theory and statistical modelling. Ecological modelling, 157(2):101
118, 2002.
[2] R. Beard, T. McLain, M. Goodrich, and E. Anderson. Coordinated target
assignment and intercept for unmanned air vehicles. IEEE Transactions on
Robotics and Automation, 18(6):911922, 2002.
[3] J. Benton and V. Subrahmanian. Using hybrid knowledge bases for missile siting
problems. In Proceedings of the Tenth Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence for
Applications, pages 141148, 1994.
[4] J. Berger, A. Boukhtouta, A. Benmoussa, and O. Kettani. A new mixed-integer
linear programming model for rescue path planning in uncertain adversarial
environment. Computers & Operations Research, 39(12):34203430, 2012.
[5] D. Bertsekas. Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control. Athena Scientiﬁc,
2005.
[6] A. Boukhtouta, A. Bedrouni, J. Berger, F. Bouak, and A. Guitouni. A survey
of military planning systems. Technical report, Defense Research and Devel-
oopment Canada, 2004.
[7] A. Brenning. Spatial prediction models for landslide hazards: review, compar-
ison and evaluation. Natural Hazards and Earth System Science, 5(6):853862,
2005.
[8] E. Dijkstra. A note on two problems in connexion with graphs. Numerische
mathematik, 1(1):269271, 1959.
[9] R. Durrett. Essentials of Stochastic Processes. Springer, 1999.
76
[10] T. Erlandsson. Route planning for air missions in hostile environments. The
Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Tech-
nology, 12(3):289303, 2015.
[11] T. Erlandsson and L. Niklasson. Automatic evaluation of air mission routes
with respect to combat survival. Information Fusion, 20:8898, 2014.
[12] T. Erlandsson and L. Niklasson. An air-to-ground combat survivability model.
The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology,
Technology, 12(3):273287, 2015.
[13] G. Espa, R. Benedetti, A. De Meo, U. Ricci, and S. Espa. Gis based models and
estimation methods for the probability of archaeological site location. Journal
of Cultural Heritage, 7(3):147155, 2006.
[14] M. Fischer and J. Wang. Spatial data analysis: models, methods and techniques.
Springer Science & Business Media, 2011.
[15] M. Fleming and R. Hoﬀer. Machine processing of landsat mss data and dma
topographic data for forest cover type mapping. Technical report.
[16] W. Franklin, C. Ray, and S. Mehta. Geometric algorithms for siting of air
defense missile batteries. Technical report, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,
1994.
[17] J. Hespanha, H. Kizilocak, and Y. Ateskan. Probabilistic map building for
aircraft-tracking radars. In Proceedings of the American Control Conference,
pages 43814386, 2001.
[18] A. Hofmann, . Ho²ková-Mayerová, V. Talhofer, and V. Kova°ík. Creation of
models for calculation of coeﬃcients of terrain passability. Quality & Quantity,
49(4):16791691, 2015.
[19] K. Jones. A comparison of algorithms used to compute hill slope as a property
of the dem. Computers & Geosciences, 24(4):315323, 1998.
[20] M. Jun and R. D'Andrea. Path planning for unmanned aerial vehicles in un-
certain and adversarial environments. In Cooperative Control: Models, Appli-
cations and Algorithms, volume 1, pages 95110. 2003.
77
[21] P. Kabamba, S. Meerkov, and F. Zeitz. Optimal path planning for unmanned
combat aerial vehicles to defeat radar tracking. Journal of Guidance, Control,
and Dynamics, 29(2):279288, 2006.
[22] E. Kirk. Optimal Control Theory, An Introduction. Dover Publications, 1998.
[23] A. Law. Simulation Modeling & Analysis. McGraw-Hill, 1998.
[24] C. Lloyd. Spatial Data Analysis - An Introduction for GIS users. Oxford
University Press, 2010.
[25] J. Marcum. A statistical theory of target detection by pulsed radar. IRE
Transactions on Information Theory, 6(2):59267, 1960.
[26] M. Pachter and J. Hebert. Optimal aircraft trajectories for radar exposure
minimization. In Proceedings of the 2001 American Control Conference, pages
23652369, 2001.
[27] Z. Peng, B. Li, X. Chen, and J. Wu. Online route planning for uav based
on model predictive control and particle swarm optimization algorithm. In
10th World Congress on Intelligent Control and Automation (WCICA), pages
397401, 2012.
[28] H. Puustinen. Military aircraft routing with multi-objective network optimiza-
tion and simulation. Master's thesis, Aalto University, School of Science, 2013.
[29] M. Richards, J. Scheer, and W. Holm. Principles of Modern Radar, Volume I
- Basic Principles. SciTech Publishing, 2010.
[30] P. Ritter. A vector-based slope and aspect generation algorithm. Photogram-
metric Engineering and Remote Sensing, 53(8):11091111, 1987.
[31] V. Roberge, M. Tarbouchi, and G. Labonte. Comparison of parallel genetic
algorithm and particle swarm optimization for real-time uav path planning.
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 9(1):132141, 2013.
[32] R. Sheldon et al. A ﬁrst course in probability. Pearson Prentice Hall, 9th
edition, 2014.
[33] S. Theodoridis and K. Koutroumbas. Pattern Recognition. Elsevier, 2009.
[34] V. Väisänen to Riku Hyytiäinen. Memorandum. Ohjusilmatorjunnan
mallinnus, Nov 2015.
78
[35] C. Zheng, L. Li, F. Xu, F. Sun, and M. Ding. Evolutionary route planner for
unmanned air vehicles. IEEE Transactions on Robotics, 21(4):609620, 2005.
79
Appendix A
Probability of detection (PD)
In each model discussed in this thesis, the capabilities of radar sensors to detect
an A/G weapon play a vital role. Radar sensors include all sensors that transmit
radio signals and by listening to the reﬂections of the transmitted signals determine
whether there is a target in the vicinity. Only monostatic radars, i.e., radars in
which the transmitter and receiver are co-located are considered. The capability of
a sensor to detect the A/G weapon is measured with the probability of detection.
The probability of detection PD describes the probability whereby the sensor is able
to detect a target in a given location. This appendix is written with reference to
Principles of Modern Radar by M. Richards et. al. [29].
A radar sensor operates by transmitting short pulses of electromagnetic radiation
and by listening to possible reﬂections or echoes from targets in the vicinity. The
basic working principle of radar sensors is portrayed in Figure A.1. For a target to
be successfully detected, the electromagnetic pulse radiated by the transmitter must
reach the target and the radiation reﬂected from the target must reach the receiver
with suﬃcient intensity, so that it can be distinguished from static noise. The
diﬀerent stages of target detection with a radar sensor will be considered separately
in order to determine the performance capability of a radar sensor.
First, the incident power density at the target is determined. Given an isotropic
transmitter, i.e., a transmitter that radiates electromagnetic radiation homogenously
in all directions, the power density at distance R is
Qi =
Pt
4piR2
, (A.1)
where Pt is the power at which the radar is transmitting. This is because the power
at which the radar is transmitting is evenly spread out on the surface of a sphere of
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Figure A.1: The working principle of a radar sensor.
radius R. However, the electromagnetic radiation is usually directed to the assumed
direction of a target. This is done with an antenna which is modeled mathematically
by multiplying the Equation (A.1) with a transmitting gain coeﬃcient Gt. Thus,
the incident power density at the target is
Qi =
PtGt
4piR2
, (A.2)
where Pt is the power with which the radar is transmitting, Gt is the gain coeﬃcient
of the transmitting antenna and R is the distance of the target from the transmitter.
The electromagnetic radiation incident on the target is either reﬂected or ab-
sorbed by the target. The portion of the incident power which is reﬂected is repre-
sented by the radar cross-section σ of the target. The target is modeled to be an
isotropic radiator radiating with power
Preﬂ = Qiσ, (A.3)
whereQi is the incident power density and is calculated with Equation (A.2). The re-
ﬂected power is calculated by substitutingQi in Equation (A.3) with Equation (A.2),
i.e.,
Preﬂ =
PtGtσ
4piR2
.
It is assumed that the reﬂected power is radiated isotropically, and thus the reﬂected
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power density incident at the radar receiver is
Qr =
Preﬂ
4piR2
=
PtGtσ
(4pi)2R4
.
The power received by the receiver is calculated as
Pr =
PreﬂAe
4piR2
=
PtGtAeσ
(4pi)2R4
, (A.4)
where Ae is the eﬃcient area of the receiver's antenna, i.e., the area of the antenna
on which reﬂected radiation is incident to, taking into account possible ineﬃciencies.
As shown in [29], the gain coeﬃcient G of an antenna is dependent of the eﬃcient
area Ae of the antenna with relation
G =
4piAe
λ2
, (A.5)
where λ is the wavelength of the electromagnetic radiation used. Solving the eﬃcient
area Ae from Equation (A.5) and substituting that into Equation (A.4), the power
received by the receiver is
Pr =
PtGtGrλ
2σ
(4pi)3R4
, (A.6)
where Pt is the power with which the radar is transmitting, Gt is the gain coeﬃcient
of the transmitting antenna, Gr is the gain coeﬃcient of the receiving antenna, λ
is the wavelength at which the radar is transmitting, σ is the radar cross-section of
the target, and R is the distance of the target from the transmitter.
Up to this point all of the subsystems have been treated as ideal systems with
no losses. In reality, the power received by the receiver is less than what Equa-
tion (A.6) predicts. Losses which are taken into account often include losses in the
electrical components between the transmitter and the antenna, the attenuation of
the electromagnetic signal while propagating in the atmosphere, losses in the electri-
cal components connecting the antenna to the receiver, and losses related to signal
processing. These losses are modeled with the system loss coeﬃcient Ls. Taking
into account all losses in the system, the ﬁnal power at which the reﬂected signals
are observed is
Pr =
PtGtGrλ
2σ
(4pi)3R4Ls
.
Ideally, a radar could detect all objects which are not shadowed by the terrain or
other obstructions. This is because even the weakest signals that are reﬂected from
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objects very far away could, in an ideal system, be ampliﬁed until they are large
enough to be registered. In practice, however, the signal is interfered by noise origi-
nating from diﬀerent sources, and weak signals might be very diﬃcult or impossible
to distinguish from the noise. Noise entering the antenna can originate from multiple
sources such as outer space, the sun, and the surface of the earth. However, it is of-
ten assumed that the thermal noise originating from electronical components within
the receiver dominates over the noise entering the receiver through the antenna [29].
Thermal noise is caused by the random movement of electrons in the electrical
components due to the ambient temperature in the receiver. Thermal noise can
be characterised as white noise and as such its power spectral density is uniform,
i.e., the noise power does not depend on the frequency or wave length at which the
noise is being observed. The observed thermal noise power depends on the ambient
temperature Ts of the receiver and the bandwidth B being observed, and is written
as
Pn = kTsB = kT0FB, (A.7)
where k is the Boltzmann constant, T0 is the standard temperature (290 K) and
F is the noise ﬁgure of the receiver subsystem. The optimal bandwidth which
should be observed to maximise the resulting signal-to-noise ratio is approximately
the reciprocal of the pulse width τ [29], i.e., the length of the pulse sent by the
transmitted. The bandwidth in Equation (A.7) is substituted with B = 1/τ :
Pn =
kT0F
τ
.
The signal-to-noise ratio can now be calculated as the ratio of the received power
and the thermal noise power:
SNR =
PtGtGrλ
2στ
(4pi)3R4LskT0F
.
When trying to determine whether there is a target in a given direction, it is com-
mon practice that multiple signal pulses are sent, and by combining the reﬂected
signals of each of these pulses the likelihood that a target is in the given direction
is determined. It is assumed that the signals are combined through a process called
coherent integration, in which both the amplitude and phase of the signal are taken
into account. By combining the signals by coherent integration, the signal-to-noise
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ratio can be enhanced and the resulting signal-to-noise ratio is
SNRc(np) =
PtGtGrλ
2στnp
(4pi)3R4LskT0F
, (A.8)
where Pt is the peak power at which the transmitter is transmitting, Gt is the gain of
the transmitting antenna, Gr is the gain of the receiving antenna, λ is the wavelength
whereby the transmitter is transmitting, σ is the radar cross-section of the target, τ
is the pulse width, np is the amount of pulses which are combined, R is the distance
at which the target is, Ls is the loss coeﬃcient of the complete system, k is the
Boltzmann constant, T0 is the standard temperature, and F is the noise ﬁgure of
the receiver.
Thermal noise is stochastic in nature and as such the identiﬁcation of signals from
within the noise is not trivial. This is demonstrated in Figure A.2 in which thermal
noise is presented. The thermal noise is accompanied with signals with amplitude
0.8 V at bins 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 90. A common scheme is to set a
threshold voltage, so that every time a signal voltage greater than the threshold is
observed at the sensor, a signal is interpreted as being present. A threshold voltage
is also presented in Figure A.2. Every bin where the signal peaks above the threshold
voltage is interpreted as containing a signal. However, due to the stochastic nature
of the noise, it is possible that the voltage which is observed exceeds the threshold
voltage even though there is no actual signal present. In Figure A.2, this is seen
in bin 8, where there is no actual signal present but nevertheless the thermal noise
voltage exceeds the threshold voltage. The probability of this happening is denoted
with the probability of false alarm PFA. On the other hand, it is possible that due to
the stochastic thermal noise, an actual signal that without noise would be identiﬁed
does not cause a great enough voltage at the sensor to exceed the threshold and thus
goes unnoticed. This is seen in Figure A.2 at bins 50 and 90 where there is indeed a
signal present, but due to the thermal noise the measured voltage does not exceed
the threshold voltage. The probability that an actual signal caused by a target is
successfully identiﬁed is denoted with the probability of detection PD.
Radar systems can be characterised as either coherent or noncoherent systems.
A noncoherent system only registers the amplitude of incoming signals and noise
while coherent systems register both the amplitude and phase of a signal. Thus, the
coherent systems eﬀectively measure two components of a signal which are commonly
denoted by in-phase component I and quadrature component Q [29]. The resultant
voltage of a signal is v =
√
I2 +Q2. In thermal noise, both components of the
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Figure A.2: Thermal noise accompanied with signals of amplitude 0.8 V in bins 10,
20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90.
signal I and Q are approximately normally distributed. Thus, the resultant voltage
of thermal noise is stochastic and distributed according to the Rayleigh-distribution:
pn(v) =
v
σ2n
exp (− v
2
2σ2n
), (A.9)
where σ2n is the variance of the resultant voltage, i.e., the mean square noise volt-
age. The mean square noise voltage is proportional to the thermal noise power. A
probability density function for the measured voltage when there is only thermal
noise present is shown in Figure A.3a. With Equation (A.9), the probability of false
alarm PFA is calculated for any given threshold voltage VT :
PFA =
∞∫
VT
pn(v)dv = − exp ( V
2
T
2σ2n
). (A.10)
Further, a minimum threshold voltage needed to achieve a probability of false alarm
PFA is determined by solving the threshold voltage VT from Equation (A.10). The
expression achieved for the threshold voltage needed to achieve a given probability
of false alarm is
VT =
√
2σ2n ln (1/PFA). (A.11)
The threshold voltage for a false alarm rate of PFA = 10−2 is plotted in Figure A.3.
The shaded area to the right of the threshold voltage in Figure A.3a represents the
probability of a false alarm, i.e., a signal is thought to be present even though no
signal actually exists.
The resulting voltage that is achieved when thermal noise is accompanied with
a signal of voltage vs is represented with the Rician distribution [29]. The Rician
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Figure A.3: The probability density function of measured voltage with a) only
thermal noise and b) thermal noise and signal.
probability density function is
ps+n(v) =
v
σ2n
exp (−v
2 + v2s
2σ2n
)I0(
vvs
σ2n
), (A.12)
where I0 is the modiﬁed Bessel function of the ﬁrst kind and zero order. The
probability density function of the resultant voltage when the thermal noise with
mean square voltage (0.2 V)2 is accompanied with a signal of amplitude 0.8 V is given
in Figure A.3b. The shaded area to the right of the threshold voltage represents the
probability that the signal is detected. The probability of detection PD is calculated
by integrating the probability density function (A.12)
PD =
∞∫
VT
v
σ2n
exp (−v
2 + v2s
2σ2n
)I0(
vvs
σ2n
)dv, (A.13)
which is not easily accomplished analytically. However, it can be calculated using
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the generalised Marcum Q-function which is deﬁned as
QM(a, b) =
∞∫
b
1
aM−1
xM exp (−x
2 + a2
2
)IM−1(ax)dx, (A.14)
where IM−1 is the modiﬁed Bessel function of the ﬁrst kind and order M − 1.
Tools for the evaluation of the Marcum Q-function are readily available in most
numerical computing environments such as MATLAB. By substituting v = σnx in
Equation (A.13), the following form is achieved:
PD =
∞∫
VT /σn
x exp (−x
2 + ( vs
σn
)2
2
)I0(
xvs
σn
)dx. (A.15)
By comparing Equations (A.14) and (A.15), and by choosing a = vs/σn, b = VT/σn,
and M = 1 the probability of detection PD can be expressed with the Marcum
Q-function as
PD = Q1
(
vs
σn
,
VT
σn
)
. (A.16)
This can further be simpliﬁed by noting that the square of the signal voltage is
proportional to the signal power received through the receiver, and the mean square
voltage of the thermal noise is similarly proportional to the thermal noise power,
i.e., vs/σn =
√
SNR. By substituting this and VT from Equation (A.11) into Equa-
tion (A.16), the probability of detection PD is written as
PD = Q1
(√
SNR,
√
2 ln (1/PFA)
)
, (A.17)
where SNR is the signal-to-noise ratio which is calculated with Equation (A.8) and
PFA is the probability of false alarm chosen by the radar operator. Probabilities
of detection calculated with Equation (A.17) using diﬀerent false alarm rates are
presented in Figure A.4.
The signal-to-noise ratio is dependent of the geometry between the sensor and
the target which the sensor is trying to detect as well as the target's orientation due
to the directional radar cross-section. Thus, the probability of detection depends
on the position of the sensor (x′, y′) as well as the location and orientation of the
target (x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ). Taking these into consideration, the probability of detection
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is written as
P
(x′,y′)
D (x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ) = Q1
(√
SNR(x′, y′, x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ),
√
2 ln (1/PFA)
)
, (A.18)
where x, y, and z depict the coordinates of the target and φ depicts the heading of
the target, θ depicts the pitch angle of the target, and ψ depicts the roll angle of
the target.
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Figure A.4: Probability of detection with diﬀerent rates of false alarm PFA.
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Appendix B
Continuous-time Markov chains
Two of the three survivability models discussed in this thesis are based on a class
of stochastic models called Markov chains. Markov chains can be used to model
ﬁnite state space systems, where the future states of the system depend on the
current state and the rules governing the transitions from one state to another. The
future states of a system described with a Markov chain do not depend on states
visited prior to the current state, but only on the state which the system is in at
a given time. This memorylessness is called the Markov property. As Markov
chains are stochastic models, the evolution of the system's state is captured by
state probabilities which generally change over time. This appendix is written with
reference to Essentials of Stochastic Processes by R. Durrett [9].
Markov chains can be grouped into discrete-time and continuous-time Markov
chains. The models discussed in this thesis are based on continuous-time Markov
chains, which are characterised with a state transition rate matrix Λ and are visu-
alised as shown in Figure B.1. The state transition rate matrix Λ deﬁnes the Markov
chain explicitly and is written as
Λ =
−ν1 λ1,2 λ1,3λ2,1 −ν2 λ2,3
λ3,1 λ3,2 −ν3
 ,
where λi,j is the transition rate from state i to state j and νi =
∑
j λi,j, i.e., the rate
at which the system leaves state i.
Given the knowledge that the system X is in the state i at time t, the probability
that the system is in some other state j after an inﬁnitesimal amount of time dt is
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Figure B.1: A generic continuous-time Markov chain with three states.
calculated from the state transition rate λi,j:
P (X(t+ dt) = j|X(t) = i) = λi,jdt.
Similarly, the probability that, given the knowledge of the system being in state i
at time t, the system is still in the same state i after time dt is determined with
P (X(t+ dt) = i|X(t) = i) = 1− νidt.
Consequently the evolution of the state probabilities pi(t) = P (X(t) = i) is described
with the diﬀerential equation
p˙(t) = ΛTp(t), (B.1)
where p(t) is the state probability vector containing the probabilities that at time
t the system is in each of the diﬀerent states and Λ is the transition rate matrix
of the Markov chain. The transitions between the states can also be characterised
as Poisson processes and the time taken for the transition to happen is exponen-
tially distributed with parameter λi,j. This is particularly useful when estimating
parameters for models based on continuous-time Markov chains as the average time
τi,j needed for the transition from state i to state j is the reciprocal of the state
transition rate, i.e.,
τi,j =
1
λi,j
. (B.2)
Each element in the state probabilty vector p(t) corresponds to the probability
of being in each of the states of the Markov chain at time t. With reference to the
90
Markov survivability model, the elements of p(t) are the probabilities of an S/A
threat unit portrayed by the Markov chain being in each of the states Undetected,
Tracked, Locked, and Hit" at time t. Similarly, in the Erlandsson survivability
model, the elements of the vector p(t) are the probabilities of S/A threat group
depicted by the Markov chain being in each of the states Undetected, Detected,
Tracked, Engaged, and Hit at time t.
Markov chains used in the Markov survivability model and the Erlandsson sur-
vivability model are inhomogenous time-continuous Markov chains. This means
that state transition rates are not time-invariant, but can vary in time. Thus, the
diﬀerential equation (B.1) is rewritten as
p˙(t) = Λ(t)Tp(t). (B.3)
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Appendix C
Slope coeﬃcient (Cslope)
In the spatial prediction model, the slope coeﬃcient is deﬁned as
Cslope(φ) =

1 if |φ| ≤ Φlow
Φhigh−|φ|
Φhigh−Φlow if Φlow < |φ| ≤ Φhigh
0 if |φ| > Φhigh
, (C.1)
where the parameters Φlow and Φhigh represent the slope angle values at which it
begins to be hard for a threat system to operate and when it becomes impossible to
operate a threat system. Furthermore, φ depicts the terrain slope angle. It should
be noted that if the two parameters Φlow and Φhigh are set to be equal, the slope
coeﬃcient Cslope becomes a binary variable and evaluates to either 1 or 0.
Next, the terrain slope angle is calculated. As the digital elevation model used
in the spatial prediction model is in raster form, i.e., the data consists of pixels
of size d × d, the terrain slope angle is calculated for each pixel separately. To
do this, many known algorithms exist [19]. In the spatial prediction model, the
method introduced by Fleming and Hoﬀer [15] and further developed by Ritter [30]
is used. In this method, the terrain slope angle is calculated with each pixel's
normal vector, which in turn is calculated with the elevation values of the pixel's four
immediately adjacent pixels. The vectors are deﬁned to be 3-dimensional and vector
r is represented by the triplet (i, j, k), where i is the displacement in x-coordinates,
j is the change in y-coordinates, and k represents the change in elevation. The
pixel of interest's neighboring pixels are indexed beginning from the pixel's western
neighbor and continuing clockwise P1, P2, P3 and P4 with elevations e1, e2, e3 and e4,
respectively.
The vectors that run through the pixel in the direction of x-axis and y-axis are
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deﬁned:
rx = (2d, 0, e3 − e1),
ry = (0, 2d, e2 − e4),
where d represents the width of one pixel. By taking the cross product of these
two vectors, a vector which is perpendicular to both of these vectors and thus the
normal vector of the pixel is obtained. That is
n = rx × ry
= (2d, 0, e3 − e1)× (0, 2d, e2 − e4)
= (−2d(e3 − e1),−2d(e2 − e4), 4d2).
The resulting normal vector is further simpliﬁed by dividing each term by 2d, i.e.,
n = (e1 − e3, e4 − e2, 2d).
To calculate the slope of the vector n, the vector's horizontal and vertical compo-
nents need to be diﬀerentiated. The vertical component is simply the third value
of the triplet which represents the vector. The horizontal component, on the other
hand, is the sum of the two ﬁrst values. Only the length of the horizontal component
is of interest. This is calculated with Pythagoras' theorem
|rh| =
√
(e1 − e3)2 + (e4 − e2)2.
Since the normal vector is perpendicular to the pixel of interest, the tangent of the
pixel's slope angle is the multiplicative inverse of the normal vector's slope angle's
tangent. Thus, the terrain slope angle is calculated with the inverse tangent function,
i.e.,
φ = arctan
√
(e1 − e3)2 + (e4 − e2)2
2d
.
93
Appendix D
Terrain coeﬃcient (Cterrain)
The terrain coeﬃcients used in example scenarios discussed in this thesis are listed
in Table D.1.
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Table D.1: The terrain coeﬃcients (Cterrain) which are used in the example scenarios.
Description Cterrain
Continuous urban fabric 0.25
Discontinuous urban fabric 0.5
Industrial or commercial units 0.5
Road and rail networks and associated land 1
Port areas 0.75
Airports 1
Mineral extraction sites 0.0025
Cottage areas 0.125
Sport and leisure areas 0.125
Golf ranges 0.25
Track (horse racing) 0.25
Non-irrigated arable land (ﬁelds) 0.25
Non-irrigated arable land (other) 0.025
Pastures 0.125
Broad-leaved forest (mineral soil) 0.0125
Broad-leaved forest (peat soil) 0.005
Coniferous forest (mineral soil) 0.0125
Coniferous forest (peat soil) 0.005
Coniferous forest (rock) 0.005
Mixed forest (mineral soil) 0.0075
Mixed forest (peat soil) 0.005
Mixed forest (rock) 0.0025
Transitional woodland shrub (canopy cover < 10%) 0.025
Transitional woodland shrub (canopy cover 10-30%, mineral soil) 0.0125
Transitional woodland shrub (canopy cover 10-30%, peat soil) 0.005
Transitional woodland shrub (canopy cover 10-30%, rock) 0.0075
Transitional woodland shrub (disused agricultural land) 0.025
Beaches, dunes, sands 0.125
Bare rocks 0.025
Wetlands 0
Water bodies 0
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